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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

New Mexico's legislature has materially amended the state's Workers'
Compensation Act ("Act") in each of its past three general sessions. In
1986, the legislature enacted the Workers' Compensation Act of 1986
("1986 Act")' which modified the existing Act ("Old Act"). 2 In 1987,
lawmakers passed a revised Act ("1987 Act");3 and, finally, on October
20, 1990, Governor Gary Carruthers signed into law the Workers' Compensation Act of 1990 ("1990 Act"). 4 The 1990 Act became effective on
January 1, 1991.1
The purpose of this survey is twofold. This article discusses how the
1990 Act modifies prior workers' compensation law. 6 Additionally, this
article examines New Mexico case law interpreting the various Acts during
the survey period. The cases surveyed involve the following areas of
workers' compensation law: appellate standard of review, the coming and
going rule, definition of "three or more employees," pre-existing injuries,
out-of-state injuries and attorneys' fees.
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT OF 1990:
CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME
The Workers' Compensation Act of 1990 has substantially rewritten
or repealed many important provisions of the Act. Frequently, the amendments reveal lawmakers' shifting preference for one theoretical basis of
compensation over another. 7 This section begins with a description of
II.

1. N.M. STAT. Am. §§ 52-1-1 to 52-5-18 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (effective from May 19, 1986
until before June 17, 1987).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to 52-5-14 (1978).
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to 52-1-70 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective from June 17, 1987
until before Jan. 1, 1991). This article refers to the prior versions of the Act by the year in which
each new Act was passed. Practitioners, however, employ a different terminology, referring to the
1986 Act as the "Interim Act" and the 1987 Act as the "New Act."
4. Id. §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (effective Jan. 1, 1991). One of the earliest commentaries on the 1990
Act is Dunn, The Workers' Compensation Act of 1990, (Nov. 1990) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the New Mexico Law Review). Mr. Dunn's article provided invaluable guidance to this
survey in organizing the 1990 Act's revisions of prior law.
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). There are two
exceptions to the effective date of the 1990 Act. The 1990 Act requires that the Workers' Compensation
Act applies only to employers of three or more employees instead of four or more employees as
mandated under prior law. Id. § 52-1-6(A). The 1990 Act, however, stipulates that, effective Jan.
1, 1992, the Act will be applicable to all employees engaged in construction activities regardless of
the number of employees. Id. § 52-1-6. The 1990 Act also mandates that the provisions relating
to the newly created medical benefits monitoring systems be effective by April 1, 1991. Id.
6. This article will not discuss the 1990 Act's amendments to the following: the Group SelfInsurance Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-6-1 to -25 (Repl. Pamp. 1991); the Insurance Code's rate
classifications, id. §§ 59A-17-8 to -17; and the Workers' Compensation Assigned Risk Pool Law,
id. §§ 59A-33-3 to -12. The 1990 Act creates two acts which also will not be discussed, including
the Self-Insurers' Guarantee Fund Act, id. §§ 52-8-1 to -12, and the Employers' Mutual Company
Act, id. §§ 52-9-1 to -25.
7. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

the policy objectives of the Act and then details those provisions of the
1990 Act that most significantly change, or add to, prior workers' compensation law. 8
The provisions of the 1990 Act surveyed include: administrative provisions; disability definitions; method of calculating workers' benefits;
determination of average weekly wages; the duration of benefits; attorneys'
fees and discovery costs; medical care provisions; notice requirements;
statutory causes of action; provision for rehiring the injured worker; and
lump sum settlement requirements.
A.

The Competing Policy Objectives
The revisions of the Workers' Compensation Act over the past five
years can be viewed as the legislature's attempt to balance competing
policy interests inherent in adm-inistering this comprehensive legislation.
Historically, the principal objective of workers' compensation schemes
has been to provide at least minimal financial security for injured workers
so that their families do not become dependant upon state welfare programs.9 The Act reflects the belief that industry is best situated to bear
the costs of personal injuries suffered by workers in the course of their
employment.10
Policy makers have also recognized that employers should not be
unfairly burdened." An important goal of the Act is to contain costs
to employers and their insurers in complying with the Act. 12 Consistent
with this goal, the legislature has attempted over the past five years to
design the Act to encourage workers to return to some level of employment
as soon as possible, reducing their dependency on compensation benefits. 34
The Act also seeks to discourage litigation between workers and employers
and to limit the administrative costs of implementing the Act."
The 1990 Act represents a generally evenhanded consideration of competing policy objectives. The legislature has tempered its desire to reduce
employers' costs with provisions in the 1990 Act that provide additional

8. Many of the revisions contained in the 1990 Act are not discussed in this article although
they may be of interest to practitioners. These include provisions relating to: the establishment of
a workers' advisory committee, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-1.2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1,
1991); confidentiality of the records of the Workers' Compensation Administration, id. § 52-5-21;
data collection, id. § 52-5-3; payment of the injured worker's uninsured motorist benefits, id. §
52-5-17; release of the injured workers' medical records, id. § 52-10-7; definition of health care
provider, id. § 52-4-1; and enforcement of default payments, id. § 52-5-10.
9. See Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 644 (1938); Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 81, 596 P.2d 521, 523 (Ct. App.), cert denied,
93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979).
10. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 104 N.M. 605,
607, 725 P.2d 581, 583 (Ct. App. 1986); Yerbich v. Heald, 89 N.M. 67, 68, 547 P.2d 72, 73 (Ct.
App. 1976).
11. See, e.g., Anaya v. New Mexico Steel Erectors Inc., 94 N.M. 370, 372, 610 P.2d 1199,
1201 (1980).
12. See, e.g., infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (case management and fee review programs).
13. See, e.g., infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (return to work provisions).
14. See, e.g, infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (ombudsman program).
15. See, e.g., infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (utilization review program).
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protection and benefits to workers.' 6 The provisions of the 1990 Act
discussed below demonstrate the legislature's consideration of the mix of
policy issues inherent in workers' compensation law.
The New Workers' Compensation Administration: Sections 52-5-1
through 52-5-22
The 1990 Act significantly changes the nature of the agency responsible
for administering workers' compensation law. The 1990 Act replaces the
Workers' Compensation Division with the Workers' Compensation Administration ("Administration"),17 and describes the new agency as being
"administratively attached to the labor department.'8 The legislature's
original declaration of intent in creating the Workers' Compensation
Division is preserved by the 1990 Act and applied to the Administration:
It is the intent of the legislature in creating the workers' compensation
administration that the laws administered by it to provide a workers'
benefit system be interpreted to assure the quick and efficient delivery
of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers
at a reasonable cost to employers who are subject to the provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act. ....
The 1990 Act vests the Administration with the authority and responsibility to achieve the legislature's twin aims. Inherent in the broad
administrative changes of the 1990 Act, however, is a tension between
the Administration's dual roles of enforcement and assistance3 ° The Act's
recent amendments require the Administration to aggressively investigate
the conduct of workers, employers, health care providers, and2 insurers
in order to monitor compliance with the Act's new provisions. ' Simultaneously, the Administration must establish programs designed to inform
all parties of their rights and responsibilities under the Act, to assist
employers in evaluating safety procedures," and to assess the cost-effectiveness of the new compensation scheme.23 These new functions will
require the Administration to be both enforcer and assistant to all parties
involved in compensation claims.
B.

.9

1. Safety and Fraud Division: Section 52-5-1.3
Motivated by the observation that a healthy worker needs no com25
pensation benefits, 24 and the perception that fraudulent claims abounded,

16. See, e.g., infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text (workplace safety programs).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1.2 (Rep[. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). The legislature
has grouped the administrative amendments to the Act under the short title, "Workers' Compensation
Administrative Act," Id. §§ 52-5-1 to -20.
18. Id. § 52-1-1.2.
19. Id. § 52-5-1.
20. See Aurbach, Workers' Compensation Division: Impact of 1990 Act on the Administration
of Claims; Safety and Fraud Division; Ombudsman, Administrative Boards; Confidentiality, 3 (Oct.
1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the New Mexico Law Review).
21. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.

23. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
24. See Aurbach, supra note 20, at 3.
25. Id.
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the legislature created the Safety and Fraud Division within the Workers'
Compensation Administration.2 The Safety and Fraud Division ("Division") is responsible for developing new programs designed to heighten
safety requirements 8 in the workplace 27 and to investigate and punish
2
fraudulent conduct.
The Division is required to develop a program to identify "extrahazardous employers. "29 These are employers whose "injury frequencies
substantially exceed those that may reasonably be expected in that employer's business or industry. '"30 The Division's safety program is intended
to identify high-risk employers, notify them of their unsafe status and
offer safety consultation while punishing employers who do not comply
with the Division's safety requirements. 3a
An employer who receives notice that she is "extra-hazardous" is
required to obtain a "safety consultant" within thirty days.3 2 The Division
provides consultants, or the employer and her insurer can choose another
professional approved by the Administration's director.13 The consultant
is required to file a report with the employer and the Division which
identifies any hazardous conditions or practices. 34 The 1990 Act then
requires the employer, in consultation with the safety consultant, to
develop an accident prevention plan that addresses the specific hazards
identified by the consultant. 35 Employers who fail to develop a safety
plan within "a reasonable time" may be subject to a fine not to exceed
$5,000.36

The Division, under the 1990 Act, must investigate workers, employers
and insurers "to determine whether any fraudulent practice relating to
worker's compensation is being practiced." ' 37 The Division shall refer to
law enforcement authorities any finding of fraud and bring such a finding
to the attention of the workers' compensation judge if it involves a
38
pending claim.
The Safety and Fraud Division reveals the conflict inherent in the
Administration's new duties. The Division is in a position to educate

26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1.3(A).
27. See id. § 52-1-1.3(B). The 1990 Act mandates that every employer subject to the Act's
provisions shall receive an annual safety inspection. Id. § 52-1-6.2(A). The director is responsible
for determining the adequacy and structure of workplace safety inspections, including provisions
for employer self-inspection. Id.
28. Id. § 52-5-1.3(E).
29. Id. § 52-5-1.3(B).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 52-5-1.3(C).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 52-5-1.3(D).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 52-5-1.3(E). This statute defines fraud as including "the intentional misrepresentation
of a material fact relating to a workers' compensation ... coverage." Id. § 52-5-1.3 (F). Misrepresentation may occur through "conduct, practices, omissions or representations of any person."
Id.
38. Id. § 52-5-1.3(F).
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employers as to safety hazards and consult with them in order to improve
workers' safety. The Division is also required to investigate and punish
employers who fail to meet its safety requirements or who engage in
fraudulent conduct. The Act may encourage employers to cooperate with
the Administration to improve safety in the workplace; however, some
employers may be dissuaded from open interaction with the Administration
in fear of the agency's new investigative and punitive authority.
Utilization Review, Case Management, and Fee Schedule
Programs: Sections 52-4-2, 52-4-3, 52-4-5
Under the 1987 Act, the director had little authority to investigate
whether health care providers were charging excessive fees or providing
9
inadequate services to injured claimants. The 1987 Act allowed a person
alleging that a health care provider charged4° excessive fees to file an
application for fee review with the director. The director, under prior
law, referred the application to a peer review organization whose report
evaluated before making "his decision concerning the disthe director
' 4'
pute.
Instead of the director initiating a fee review upon application of an
to establish a "system
aggrieved party, the 1990 Act requires the director
42 The 1990 Act defines
providers.
care
health
of
review"
of utilization
"utilization review" as "an evaluation of the necessity, appropriateness,
' 43
efficiency and quality of health care services.
If the director, pursuant to his utilization review, finds that a health
services,
care provider imposes excessive charges or renders inappropriate
4 These penalties
penalties.
of
range
wide
a
impose
may
the director
include a forfeiture of the right to payment for those 4 services found to
45
be excessive or inappropriate; a fine of up to $1,000; 6 or, a temporary
or permanent suspension 4 7of the right to provide health care services to
claimants under the Act.
In order to determine whether a health care provider charges excessive
fees, the 1990 Act requires the director to establish a fee4 schedule setting
maximum charges for all types of medical treatment. 8 Section 52-4-5
2.

39. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until April 1, 1991).
40. Id. § 52-4-3(A).
41. Id. § 52-4-3(E).
42. Id. § 524-2.
43. Id. The director must conduct his review based on "medically accepted standards and an
objective evaluation of the health care services provided." Id. § 52-4-2(B). The statute provides
further that the director shall establish a system of "pre-admission review of all hospital admissions,
working
except emergency services." Id. § 52-4-2(C). Utilization review must commence within one
day of all hospital emergency admissions. Id.
44. Id. § 524-2(F). Health care providers are entitled to a hearing to determine if they are
charging excessive fees. Id.
45. Id. § 52-4-2(F)(1).
46. Id. § 524-2(F)(2).
47. Id. § 524-2(F)(3).
48. Id. § 52-4-5(A). The fee schedule applies to "treatment or attendance, service, devices,
the
apparatus or medicine provided by a health care provider." Id. This provision requires that
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prohibits any health care provider from receiving payments in excess of

the maximum fees set by the director. 9 A health care provider found
to charge excessive fees may appeal this determination to the director.5 0
Finally, the director must establish an advisory committee, consisting
primarily of licensed health care providers, to assist him in adopting
utilization review standards and establishing maximum fee schedules."

The director, under the 1990 Act, must also establish and maintain
case management system to evaluate injured workers' health care plansa
and to assess whether alternative health care services are appropriate and
52

cost effective. The case management system is intended to monitor the
medical progress of injured workers and to formulate a plan for return

to work. 3 The 1990 Act requires the director to contract with an independent organization to assist with the administration of the case
54

management system .

3. Ombudsman Program: Section 52-5-1.4
The director of the Administration is required to establish an ombudsman program to assist workers and employers in understanding and
protecting their rights under the Act.55 The legislature intended ombudsmen

to facilitate informal communications among unrepresented claimants,
employers, and insurers and to assist unrepresented claimants in presenting
their claims.56 Lawmakers were apparently concerned with diminishing
the role of lawyers in situations where informal mediation may suffice. 57
Section 52-5-1.4, however, limits the role of ombudsman to providing

information and facilitating communication.51 An ombudsman may not
be an advocate for any party nor assist anyone beyond informal mediation .9
C.

Defining Disability: The Theory Shifts Again
The theoretical basis underlying most workers' compensation schemes

belongs in one of three categories. w6 Compensation may be based on a
maximum rate for any service be set between the sixtieth and eightieth percentile
"of current rates
for health care providers." Id. Regulations promulgated pursuant to section
52-4-5 shall be adopted
"after review, notice and public hearing." Id. The director is to
establish a separate schedule of
maximum charges for hospital services. Id. § 524-5(G).
49. Id. § 52-4-5(D).
50. Id. § 524-5(E).
51. Id. § 524-5(F).
52. Id. § 524-3(A).
53. Id. § 52-4-3(B).
54. Id. § 524-3(C).
55. Id. § 52-5-1.4.
56. Id. § 52-5-1.4(B); see also Aurbach, supra note 20, at 2-3.
57. See Aurbach, supra note 20, at 3-4.
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1.4(D).
59. Id. An ombudsman need not be an attorney but he must demonstrate
familiarity with
workers' compensation law. Id. § 52-5-1.4(C). The director may appoint
additional ombudsmen as
he deems appropriate. Id. § 52-5-1.4(B).
60. Varela, 109 N.M. 306, 308, 784 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Ct. App. 1989); cert.
denied 109 N.M.
262, 784 P.2d 1005 (1990); 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 57.14 (1989);
DuNN, supra note 4, at 5-31.
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"loss of occupation" theory which compensates an injured worker based
on her inability to return to work at a wage or salary comparable to
62
her pre-injury wage.6 ' This is also referred to as a pure wage loss concept.
Benefits may also be awarded according to a "pure physical impairment"63
model in which a worker's impairment rating determines compensation.
Under this scheme, the higher an employee's impairment rating, the
greater his compensation.6 The third type of compensation method combines the "pure wage loss" and "pure physical impairment" models.
This method, "impairment of earning capacity," compensates a worker
based on her inability to earn comparable wages or return to any work
65
for which she is suited by age, education, training, and experience.
New Mexico's several versions of its Workers' Compensation Act have,
at one time or another, engendered all three theories of disability compensation." The 1990 Act, however, adopts a benefits theory that is a
hybrid of the "pure physical impairment" and the "impairment of earning
capacity" models. The 1990 Act awards benefits according to an injured
worker's impairment rating which is then modified to reflect the worker's
earning capacity by accounting for the worker's age, education, and
residual physical capacity. 67 Furthermore, the 1990 Act explicitly imposes
a wage loss ceiling on benefits awards, providing that "[u]nless otherwise
contracted for by the worker and employer, workers' compensation benefits shall be limited so that no worker receives more in total payments
... by not working than by continuing to work."
The 1990 Act redefines much of the vocabulary involved in benefits
computation. A number of the amendments resurrect provisions of the
1986 Act while others are entirely different formulations. These changes
to the Act's benefits structure are discussed below, comparing the theoretical underpinnings of the 1990 Act with its predecessors.
1. Impairment: Section 52-1-24
Impairment, under the 1990 Act, is the base line from which permanent
disability benefits are calculated. The 1990 Act materially alters the 1987
Act's definition of impairment by adopting a third-party standard to
determine a worker's impairment rating. The amended Act defines impairment as "an anatomical or functional abnormality existing after the
date of maximum medical improvement as determined by a medically or
scientifically demonstrable finding and based upon the most recent edition
"69
of the American medical association's guide to permanent impairment.

61.
1986).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

LARSON,

supra note 60, at § 57.17; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24(A) (Cum. Supp.

supra note 60, at § 57.16.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
Varela, 109 N.M. at 308, 784 P.2d at 1051.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26.1-26.4 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
Id. § 52-1-47.1.
Id. § 52-1-24(A).
LARSON,
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Impairment under both the 1990 Act and the 1987 Act includes physical
impairment, primary mental impairment, and secondary mental impairment. 70
2. Maximum Medical Improvement: Section 52-1-24.1
Although the 1987 Act did not utilize the concept of "maximum medical
improvement," the 1990 Act, like the 1986 Act, relies on this term
throughout its disability provisions. Under both the 1986 and 1990 Acts,
the date of maximum medical improvement is the "date after which
further recovery from or lasting improvement to an injury can no longer
be reasonably anticipated based upon reasonable medical probability." ' 7
The date of maximum medical improvement is important in distinguishing
between temporary and permanent disabilities.
3. Total Disabilities
Workers' compensation statutes categorize disabilities as being either
permanent or temporary, and either total or partial. Generally, a temporary disability is that "which lasts for a limited time only while the
workman is undergoing treatment, ' 72 and is "a condition from which
there will be either complete recovery or an impaired bodily condition
which is static. ' 73 A permanent impairment is one from which the worker
will suffer the remainder of her life, without hope of recovery or improvement.7 4 The 1990 Act has modified the definitions of temporary,
permanent, and total disabilities.
a. Temporary Total Disability: Section 52-1-25.1
The 1990 Act, like the 1986 Act, defines temporary total disability as
the inability of the injured worker "to perform his duties prior to the
date of his maximum medical improvement. ' ' 75 Case law interpreting
temporary total disability under the 1986 Act will provide guidance in
applying the 1990 Act's provision as the term is identically defined in
76
both Acts.
The legislature included within section 52-1-25.1 a provision that allows
an employer to terminate an injured worker's temporary total disability
benefits if the health care provider releases the worker to return to work
prior to the date of maximum medical improvement, and the employer
offers work at the worker's pre-injury wage. 77 This is contrary to the
arrangement under the 1986 Act which allowed an employee to collect
total temporary disability benefits, prior to the date of maximum medical

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. § 52-1-24(B), (C).
Id. § 52-1-24.1.
Lane v. Levi Strauss & Co., 92 N.M. 504, 506, 590 P.2d 652, 654 (Ct. App. 1979).
Id.; see also Dunn, supra note 4, at 51-55.
See Dunn, supra note 4, at 51-55.
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25.1(A).
76. Dunn, supra note 4, at 6-8.
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25.1(A).
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improvement, even if she was able to return to light duty work at her
pre-injury wage. 78
The 1990 Act also contemplates employers offering injured employees
work at less than pre-injury wages. A new provision reduces an injured
worker's temporary total disability benefits if the health care provider
to work, and the employer offers work at
releases the worker to return
79
less than pre-injury wages.
The "return to work" provisions contained in section 52-1-25.1 reflect
the legislature's intent to encourage employers to offer employment to
injured workers as soon as possible. The statute suggests, however, that
before a worker's benefits are reduced or terminated, the employer has
the burden of establishing that the worker's health care provider released
the worker to return to work and that the employer offered employment
0
to the worker at or below her pre-injury wages.8 Two important implications attach when these statutory requirements are satisfied. First,
the worker is expected to return to work and her benefits may be affected
if she rejects the employer's offer to return to work. Second, a worker's
benefits can be reduced only when her employer offers work, not merely
8
when there is other, similar work available to the injured worker. '
b. Permanent Total Disability: Section 52-1-25
The legislature's frequent shifting of the theoretical premise of disability
compensation is best revealed by the manner in which it has previously
defined "permanent total disability." Under New Mexico's original Workers' Compensation Act, courts applied a "capacity to perform" work
test to determine total disability. A worker, in order to claim total
disability benefits under the original Act, had to prove that she was
wholly unable to perform her pre-injury work and wholly unable to
82
perform any work for which she is suited by age, education and training.
of existing law changed the benefit model to a
The 1986 Act's revision
"wage loss" theory.8 3 Total disability, under the 1986 Act, resulted when
an injured worker could demonstrate that she was "wholly unable to
earn comparable wages or salary.""
The 1987 Act defined total disability in terms of an "impairment of
earning capacity" theory. Under this model, total disability is that "which
prevents the worker from engaging, for remuneration or profit, in any

78. Urioste v. Sideris, 107 N.M. 733, 737, 764 P.2d 504, 508 (Ct. App. 1988).
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25.1(C). An injured worker who returns to work at less than preinjury wages receives temporary total disability compensation "equal to sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of the difference between the worker's pre-injury wage and his post-injury wage." Id.
80. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 9-10.
81. Id.
82. See Smith v. City of Albuquerque, 105 N.M. 125, 131, 729 P.2d 1379, 1385 (Ct. App.
1986).
83. See Strickland v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 107 N.M. 500, 502, 760 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
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occupation for which he is... fitted by age, training or experience." 5
Permanent total disability under the 1990 Act is defined as the "total
loss of use of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or
both eyes or any two of them."" 8 Permanent total disability, therefore,
is predicated solely on physical impairment. The worker's inability to
perform work or earn comparable wages is irrelevant. 7 The 1990 Act's
permanent total disability provision is confused by the phrase "or any
two of them." This language suggests that a worker who looses any
combination of a foot, leg, arm, hand or eye is entitled to permanent
total disability benefits even if such a calamity does not render the worker
unable to perform her previous employment tasks.
4. Permanent Partial Disability: Section 52-1-26
The 1990 Act continues to include within the definition of partial
disability the following declaration: "[t]he policy and intent of the legislature is declared to be that every person who suffers a compensable
injury with resulting partial disability should be provided with the opportunity to return to gainful employment as soon as possible with minimal
dependance on compensation awards." 88 The 1990 Act's similarity with
the 1987 Act ends here, however, as the revised partial disability provision
is based on a "modified physical impairment" standard, while the 1987
Act was based on the "impairment of earning capacity" theory.8 9
Partial disability under the 1990 Act is defined as a "condition whereby
a worker ... suffers a permanent impairment." 9o The amended Act then
determines permanent partial disability by calculating the worker's "impairment as modified by the worker's age, education and physical capacity. '" 91 This modification calculation is explained in the following

section .92

Like the 1990 Act's temporary total disability provision, Section 521-26 reduces a worker's benefits if he returns to work at a wage equal

85. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
86. Id. § 52-1-25.1 (effective Jan. 1, 1991) (emphasis added).
87. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 13. The 1990 Act prohibits a judge from considering the testimony
of vocational rehabilitation experts for the purpose of determining the existence or extent of disability.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25.1(B).
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
89. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 14-15. The 1987 Act defined partial disability based on the
worker's inability to perform any work for which he is fitted by age, education and training. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991). The original Act, prior
to
1986, was also based on an "impairment of earning capacity" scheme. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 521-25 (1978). The 1986 Act, on the other hand, based partial disability on a "pure physical impairment"
theory that considered only whether the worker suffered "any anatomical or functional abnormality"
after the date of maximum medical improvement. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26(B).
91. Id. § 52-1-26(C). This subsection limits the percentage of disability awarded to ninety-nine
percent. Id.
92. See supra notes 100-134 and accompanying text.
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93
to or greater than his pre-injury wage. If an injured worker returns to
work, his permanent partial disability rating is reduced to his impairment
94
rating which is not subject to modification. This provision reflects the
idea that an injured worker's recovery should be limited to his initial
impairment rating if he is able to earn a wage equal to or greater than
his pre-injury wage. 95
Section 52-1-26 of the 1990 Act may, in some circumstances, frustrate
the legislature's intent to encourage workers to return to work at the
earliest possible time. A worker's partial disability rating, under the 1990
Act, is determined by modifying his impairment rating by a number of
objective factors. 96 It is conceivable that the portion of a worker's partial
disability benefits attributable to the modification factors 9may exceed the
income which he would receive from returning to work. 7 If the worker
rating,
returns to work his benefits would be reduced to his impairment
9 Obviously,
working.
not
was
he
when
than
less
be
would
income
his
and
in this situation, the 1990 Act provides a strong disincentive to return

to work.9
Calculation and Modification of PartialDisability: Sections 52-126.1 through 52-1-26.4
Equity demands that workers' compensation law be responsive to an
°
individual's circumstances and characteristics.' 0 Judicial efficiency, however, requires that the law be practically applied, taxing limited judicial

D.

93. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). Elsewhere in the 1990 Act are further
limitations on the amount of compensation benefits that an injured claimant may receive. Unlike
previous versions of the Act, the 1990 Act allows an employer to offset benefits paid under the
Act by any benefits paid pursuant to an employer-financed, disability compensation program which
the employer may provide in addition to coverage under the Act. Id. § 42-1-47.1. This section
provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]ompensation benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act
shall accordingly be reduced, if necessary, to account for any wages and employer-financed disability
benefits a worker receives after the time of the injury." Id. Clearly, this section was designed to
prevent an injured worker from receiving more money from the combination of benefits received
under the Workers' Compensation Act and the employers' self-financed benefit program than she
earned while working for the employer. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 36. This provision obviates
case law which has held that employers, under the Act, were not entitled to offset their compensation
obligations by any benefits paid pursuant to a voluntary, disability benefit program provided by
the employer. See Montney v. State of New Mexico, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1989)
(there is no statutory requirement for offset of credit to avoid overlapping or double payments);
Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 97 N.M. 13, 636 P.2d 284 (1981) (the Act permits an employer to enter
into a private contract with employees to pay disability benefits in addition to those provided under
the Act).
94. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26. This section's "return to work" provision differs materially
from the "return to work" provisions defining temporary total disability contained in section 521-25.1. When a worker suffers a permanent partial disability, the decision to return to work is
entirely within the worker's discretion; the employer does not have the option of offering work to
the injured employee as in the case of temporary total disability. See id. § 52-1-25.1(B), (C).
95. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 34.
96. See infra notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
97. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 34.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 32.
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resources as little as possible and, in the context of determining permanent
partial disability, an objective and easily determinable standard is favored.' 0 1 The 1990 Act attempts to resolve this conflict by employing a
modified impairment calculation in which a worker's individual characteristics may adjust his benefits award. Section 52-1-26.1(B) sets out
the calculus involved in determining an injured worker's modified impairment rating.
The worker's initial impairment rating as determined under section 521-24 is the base-line figure. 0 2 The worker receives modification "points"
for age, 03 education,' o4 and loss of physical capacity.' 0 5 These points are
combined with the initial impairment rating to arrive at a permanent
partial disability rating.'0 First, the age and education modifiers are
added together.'07 This sum is then multiplied by the physical capacity
modifier.1 8 Finally, the product of the sum of the age and education
modifiers and the physical capacity modifier is added to the base-line
impairment value to determine partial disability.3 9
1. Age Modification: Section 52-1-26.2
An injured worker may receive from zero to four points depending
on his age "at the time of the disability rating." ' 10 The 1990 Act recognizes
that the older an injured worker is, the more debilitating his injury is
likely to be; consequently, the older the claimant, the more points she
is awarded for age modification."'
2. Education Modifier: Section 52-1-26.3
Determining a claimant's education modifier is more complicated than
the calculation of the age modifier. The education modification provision,
which awards from zero to eight points, has three elements: formal
education, skills, and training."12 Points are awarded for each of these

101. Id. "The problem with justice is that it is expensive; the problem with objectivity is that
it is arbitrary and, in some instances, unfair." Id.
102. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Because an impairment rating is not determined
until after the date of maximum medical improvement, the calculation of permanent partial disability
cannot be made until after this date. See id.
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26.2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
104. Id. § 52-1-26.3.
105. Id. § 52-1-26.4.
106. Id. § 52-1-26.1(B).
107. Id.
108. Id. If the sum of the age and education modifiers is a negative number, then it shall be
treated as zero for the purposes of the partial disability calculation. Id.
109. Id. § 52-1-26.1(C). Mr. Dunn's article suggests the following equation as an aid to applying
section 52-1-26.1: Impairment + [(Age Modifier + Education Modifier) x Physical Capacity Modifier]
= Partial Disability Rating. Dunn, supra note 4, at 16.

110. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 52-1-26.2(A).

Ill. Dunn, supra note 4, at 18. Section 52-1-26.2(B) awards age points as follows: if the claimant
is forty-four years old or younger, zero points; forty-five to forty-nine years old, one point; fifty
to fifty-four years old, two points; fifty-five to fifty-nine years old, three points; and, if the claimant
is sixty years old or older, she is awarded four points. Id.
112. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26.3(A).
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3
categories; their sum constitutes the total education modification." In
general, the better educated, more skilled and better trained a claimant
is, the fewer points he will be awarded under Section 52-1-26.3.

a. Formal Education
A claimant is awarded from negative one point to two points for his
formal education." 4 A claimant who has completed college receives negative one point while a claimant who has completed the twelfth grade
.or obtained his GED collects zero points."' An injured worker who has
completed the sixth-grade, but no higher than the eleventh grade, is
to a claimant
entitled to one point. 1 6 Finally, two points are awarded
) 7
who has completed no higher than the fifth grade."
b. Vocational Skills
The education modifier awards up to four points to a claimant based
on the vocational skills he has acquired during the ten years preceding
his disability." 8 A claimant's skills are "measured by reviewing the jobs
he has successfully performed during the ten years preceding the date
of disability determination.' 1 9 The statute defines "successfully performed" as the length of time necessary for the worker "to meet the
specific vocational preparation (SVP) time requirement" for each of his
past jobs. 20
In order to determine a claimant's SVP for prior employment, section
52-1-26.3 requires a claimant to consult the "dictionary of occupational21
tables published by" the United States Department of Labor ("DOL").1
The DOL defines the specific vocational preparation time for a particular
vocation as "the amount of time required to learn the techniques, acquire
information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in
a specific job-worker situation.'" 22 The DOL assigns a point value for
the SVP time required to learn the skills of a particular job; the greater
for "average
the length of time required to obtain the skills2 necessary
3
performance," the higher the SVP point value.
The 1990 Act awards a claimant one to four skill points depending
upon his SVP value. A claimant's SVP value and his skill modification

113. Id. § 52-1-26.3(D), (E).
114. Id. § 52-1-26.3(B).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.§ 52-1-26.3(C).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. U.S. Department of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Selected Characteristics of
Occupations, Appendix D, p. 473, (1981) (quoted in Dunn, supra note 4, at 20).
123. U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 122, at 473. The Department of Labor assigns the
following values for specific vocational preparation times:
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award are inversely related: the greater the SVP score, the fewer skill
points a claimant is awarded.' 2A
c. Vocational Training
The training component of the education modifier is the least adequately
defined element of section 52-1-26.3. A worker who is unable "to competently perform a specific vocational pursuit" is awarded one point.' 25
All other workers receive no points for their training modifier. 26 The
statute fails to define competent performance or "specific vocational
pursuit." The ambiguity of this provision is not likely to cause much
controversy as only one modification point is involved.
3. Physical Capacity Modification: Section 52-1-26.4
The 1990 Act awards from one to eight impairment modification points
to a claimant "based on the difference between the physical capacity
necessary to perform the worker's usual and customary work and the
worker's residual physical capacity.' 2 7 "Physical capacity" is defined in
terms of physical ability to lift a certain amount of weight or perform
certain functions.2 The revised Act categorizes physical capacity as being
either "Heavy," "Medium," "Light," or "Sedentary."' 29 Generally, the
greater the loss of physical capacity the claimant suffers as a result of
a work-related accident, the more points she is awarded.
In order to calculate a claimant's physical capacity modifier, her residual
physical capacity must first be determined. Residual physical capacity

Points Awarded
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Time Required to Learn Job
Short demonstration
Anything beyond short demonstration up to and including 30 days.
Over 30 days up to and including 3 months.
Over 3 months up to and including 6 months.
Over 6 months up to and including .1 year.
Over 1 year up to and including 2 years.
Over 2 years up to and including 4 years.
Over 4 years up to and including 9 years.
Over 10 years.

Id.
124. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26.3(C). A claimant with an SVP value of one or two, receives
four points for her skill component of the education modification; an SVP value of three or four
merits three points; an SVP of five or six entitles the worker to two points; and, the worker with
an SVP of seven to nine is awarded one point. Id.
125. Id. § 52-1-26.3(D).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 52-1-26.4(B).
128. Id. § 52-1-26.4.
129. Id. § 52-1-26.4(C). This provision defines the physical capacity categories as follows. "Heavy"
is the ability to lift over fifty pounds occasionally or up to fifty pounds frequently. "Medium" is
the ability to lift up to fifty pounds occasionally or up to twenty-five pounds frequently. "Light"
means the ability to lift up to twenty pounds occasionally or up to ten pounds frequently. This
category also includes occupations which require a significant amount of walking or standing as
well as jobs which involve sitting while operating leg or arm controls. "Sedentary" is the ability
to lift up to ten pounds occasionally or up to five pounds frequently. Sedentary jobs require only
occasional walking or standing. Id.
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refers to the claimant's post-injury functional ability. If, for example, a
claimant's pre-injury, customary work required a "Heavy" physical capacity and, as a result of her accident, she is only capable of "Sedentary"
work, her residual physical capacity is considered to be "Sedentary."
The claimant is then awarded points according to the magnitude of the
difference between her pre-injury physical capacity and her residual physical capacity.' 30 The statute sets out a table that computes physical capacity
modification points as a function of the relationship between a worker's
3
pre-injury, physical capacity and her post-injury, residual capacity. ' In
because her physical
our example, the claimant is awarded eight points 32
capacity decreased from "Heavy" to "Sedentary.'
In the past, evidence of loss of physical capacity could be introduced
through the injured worker, the treating physician, the physician who
performed the independent medical examination, a physical therapist
specialized in physical capacity evaluations, or any other health care
provider who evaluated the claimant and who could provide useful information. 33 The 1990 Act, however, restricts the sources of evidence
to chiropractors, medical physicians, and
of loss of physical capacity
34
'
physicians.
osteopathic
E. Determination of Average Weekly Wage: Section 52-1-20
The 1990 Act has materially changed the provisions determining a
worker's average weekly wage ("AWW"). Under prior law, AWW was
calculated on the basis of the weekly, monthly, or hourly wage rate
contracted for by the worker and employee. 35 Section 52-1-20(B) of the
1990 Act, however, calculates AWW on the basis of a worker's earnings
during a twenty-six week period. 36 The AWW of an injured employee

130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26.4(B).
131. Id. Section 52-1-26.4(B) awards points based on the following table:

PRE-INJURY
PHYSICAL CAPACITY
(usual and
customary work)

Sedentary
Light
Medium
Heavy

RESIDUAL PHYSICAL CAPACITY
Heavy
Medium
Light
Sedentary
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
4
1
2
4
8

Thus, a worker with a pre-injury physical capacity of "Medium" who, as a result of her injury,
can perform only "Light" work, is awarded two points.
132. See supra note 131.
133. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 24.
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-26.4(D). This section provides: "The determination of a worker's
residual physical capacity shall be made by a health care provider defined in Subsection C, E or
G of Section 52-4-1 NMSA 1978. If the worker or employer disagrees on who shall make this
determination, the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section
52-1-51 NMSA 1978." Subsections C, E or G of Section 52-4-1 approve as health care providers
chiropractors, medical physicians and osteopathic physicians. Id. § 52-4-1.
135. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20(B)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991). Under
this old provision, for example, if a worker is being paid by the month for his services, his AWW
is calculated by multiplying his monthly wage at the time of the accident by twelve and dividing
by fifty-two. Id.
136. Id. § 52-1-20(B).
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who has been working for longer that twenty-six weeks, for example, is
determined by computing the total wages paid to the worker during the
twenty-six weeks preceding the date of the injury and dividing that figure
by twenty-six. 37 The Act's revised provision also sets out the calculus
involved in computing AWW when an employee has worked fewer than

twenty-six weeks. 3 '

F. Duration of Compensation Benefits: Sections 52-1-41 and 52-1-42
The 1990 Act significantly changes the duration over which a worker
may receive both total and partial disability benefits. The revised Act
extends the period over which benefits for total disability may be paid
from the 700 week limitation imposed by the Old Act, 3 9 to the entire
lifetime of the injured worker. 14° Additionally, partial disability benefits
under the 1990 Act may extend for 700 weeks in some circumstances as
compared to the 500 week limit imposed by the 1987 Act.' 4'
The duration of partial disability benefits is based on the nature and
extent of the worker's partial disability. When the worker's partial disability rating is eighty percent or greater, benefits may extend for 700
weeks. 142 If the worker's partial disability rating is less than eighty percent,
then the worker can receive benefits for a maximum of 500 weeks. 43
The 1990 Act provides that, in determining the duration an injured
worker is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits, the amount
of time a worker received temporary total disability benefits must be
considered.'" If, under the 1990 Act, an injured worker receives temporary
total disability benefits prior to an award of partial disability benefits,
the maximum period for partial disability benefits shall be reduced by
"the number of weeks the worker actually receives temporary total disability benefits." ' 41 The provision overrules prior case law which held
137. Id. § 52-1-20(B). The revised AWW statute has made only modest changes to the definition
of "total wages." Both the Old and 1990 Acts include in the definition of wages "the reasonable
value of board, rent housing or lodging received from the employer." Id. § 52-1-20(A); cf. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991). Unlike its predecessors,
the 1990 Act explicitly includes gratuities and overtime pay and excludes "fringe or other employment
benefits and bonuses." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20(A).
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20(A). If an employee has worked less than twenty-six weeks in
the employment in which he was injured, his AWW is determined by dividing the total wages
earned "in the employment in which the worker was injured" by the number of weeks the employee
actually worked in that employment. Id. § 52-1-20(B)(1). This provision may, in some circumstances,
invalidate Justiz v. Walgreen's, 106 N.M. 346, 742 P.2d 1051 (1987). Justiz held that when computing
the AWW for a worker who holds two jobs, it is appropriate to combine the wages from both
his full and part-time jobs. Id. In the case of a worker who has worked for less that twenty-six
weeks, Justiz may no longer apply because of the 1990 Act requirement that a worker's AWW be
based only on the wages earned "in the employment in which the worker was injured." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20(B)(1); see also Dunn, supra note 4, at 31-33.
139. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41(A) (1978).
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
141. Id. § 52-1-42(A) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
142. Id. § 52-1-42(A)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
143. Id. § 52-1-42(A)(2).

.144. Id. § 52-1-42(B).
145. Id.
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that the duration of a worker's partial permanent disability benefits may
not be reduced by the number of weeks the worker received temporary
total disability benefits.'4
Attorneys' Fees and Discovery Costs: Section 52-1-54
The 1990 Act has materially changed the Act's provisions regulating
the allocation of attorneys' fees and discovery costs. Furthermore, the
amended Act attempts to encourage settlement by adopting an "offer
of judgment" procedure.
G.

1. Attorneys' Fees
Historically, the Act has regulated two aspects of attorneys' fees: who
pays the fees and what limits the fees. Under the Old Act, the employer
was responsible for paying one hundred percent of the claimant's attorneys' fees which could not exceed ten percent of the injured worker's
total compensation award. 47 The 1986 Act limited claimants' attorneys'
fees to the combination of twenty-five percent of the $5,000 awarded,
fifteen percent of the next $5,000 of benefits and ten percent of the
remaining benefits secured for the claimant. 4 The claimant, under the
1986 Act, was responsible for paying his own attorneys' fees except when
refused to pay benefits or when an employer
the employer unreasonably
' 49
faith.'
"bad
acted in
The 1987 Act limited claimants' fees to $12,500, except when an
employer acted in "bad faith,"' 5 0 in which case the workers' compensation
judge could award fees in excess of the statutory limit."' The 1987 Act
required the worker to pay twenty-five percent of her attorneys' fees and
2
the employer was responsible for the remaining seventy-five percent."
The 1990 Act blends elements of each of its predecessors and obtains
the most equitable attorneys' fees arrangement to date. Attorneys' fees,
under the 1990 Act, are shared equally between claimant and employer,'
except when modified by the "offer of judgment" procedure described
below.' 5 4 The amended Act, for the first time in New Mexico, imposes
a bilateral limitation on attorneys' fees: both claimants' and employers'
fees may not exceed $12,500.' 55 This rectifies one of the Act's most

146. See Sorbet v. Riley Indus. Servs., No. 11, 568, (Ct. App. 1989) (memorandum decision).
147. N.M, STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(A) (1978).
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
149. Id. § 52-1-54(C). This subsection defines "bad faith" as "conduct by the employer in the
handling of a claim which amounts to fraud, malice, oppression or willful, wanton or reckless
disregard for the rights of the workman." Id. § 52-1-54(C)(3). A determination of bad faith is
made in a separate fact-finding proceeding. Id.
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991). This provision
adopts the 1986 Act's definition of "bad faith."
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
152. Id. § 52-1-54(H).
153. Id. § 52-1-54(l) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). This provision includes within the definition of
attorneys' fees the costs of paralegal, law clerk and other related legal services. Id.
154. See infra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
155. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(l).
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glaring inequities and, perhaps, evidences the legislature's recognition of
the "unfair advantage that employers and their insurance companies often
had over claimants" because of the one-sided fee limitation. 56
A workers' compensation judge may, under the 1990 Act, award
attorneys' fees in excess of $12,500 if she finds "bad faith" conduct by
either the employer or employee." 57 Although the "bad faith" provision
of the 1990 Act is nearly identical to the analogous sections of the 1987
and 1986 Acts,"18 the most recent amendment limits the penalty a workers'
compensation judge can impose because of bad faith to $2,500.'19 Additionally, the 1990 Act, unlike the previous Acts, subjects both employers
and claimants, instead of only employers, to bad faith scrutiny.' 60
The 1990 Act prohibits payment of either parties' attorneys' fees until
the worker's claim has been settled or adjudged. 6 ' This provision is not
included in prior versions of the Act and was probably designed to
encourage insurance defense firms to accelerate the settlement process. 6 2
The 1990 Act continues to forbid any person from receiving fees in
connection with a worker's claim except as provided for in section 521-54, 163 and like each prior Act, imposes criminal sanctions for violating
the requirements of the Act's attorneys' fee statute.'"
2. Discovery Costs
Discovery in a New Mexico workers' compensation case has always
been restricted to those procedures authorized by the workers' compensation judge.6 5 Additionally, prior Acts required the employer to bear

156. Vigil, The 1990 Workers' Compensation Act 2 (Oct. 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the New Mexico Law Review).
157. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(I).
158. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(C)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986). The 1990 Act, like the two prior Acts, requires
that a party suffer economic loss as a result of the other party's bad faith practices in order to
receive an increased fee award. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(I) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan.
1, 1991).
159. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(I) (Repl. Pamp. 1991). It is not clear whether subsection 52-154(J)'s requirement that claimants' fees be split equally between claimant and employer applies to
a bad faith award. See Vigil, supra note 156, at 3. Although the statute is ambiguous on this point,
it seems unfair and inconsistent with the Act's objective to discourage bad faith practices, to require
a party to pay half of the other party's bad faith penalty. The language of the 1990 Act, however,
supports this interpretation. See id. § 52-1-54(1), (J).
160. Id. § 52-1-54(I).
161. Id. § 52-1-54(M).
162. See Vigil, supra note 156, at 3.
163. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(A); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991)
(effective until Jan. i, 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(A) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(N) (Repl. Pamp. 1991). This subsection provides that any person
who violates the attorneys' fees provision is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of between
fifty and five hundred dollars and imprisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding ninety
days. Id. This same punishment is required by each of the previous Acts. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-1-54(K) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(F) (Cum.
Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(H) (1978).
165. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-7(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-5-7(F) (Cum. Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-34 (1978).
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the costs of both parties' discovery." The 1990 Act continues the practice
of authorized discovery, but reallocates the burden of discovery costs by
requiring that each side bear their own discovery costs with the provision
that the employer advance the worker an initial one thousand dollars
for discovery expenses' 67
The provision directing employers to advance claimants one thousand
dollars for discovery costs is somewhat confusing. Section 51-1-54(D)
provides that if a claimant "substantially prevails on the claim, any
discovery costs advanced by the employer shall be paid by that employer.' 1 If the claimant does not "substantially prevail," however,
' 69
"the employer shall be reimbursed for any discovery costs advanced."'
to generate
The statute's failure to define "substantially prevail" is likely
controversy in cases involving significant discovery costs. 70 Apparently,
each party is responsible for7 their own discovery costs in excess of $1,000
regardless of who prevails.' '
3. Offer of Judgment Procedure
The legislature grafted the offer of judgment procedure set out in Rule
1-068 of New Mexico's Rules for Civil Procedure into section 52-1-54
of the 1990 Act.' The procedure allows an employer or claimant, after
a recommended settlement offer is issued and rejected, to offer a compensation settlement to the opposing party. 7 1 If the offer is accepted by
the opposing party, the workers' compensation judge may enter a judgment enforcing the offer.'7 4 If the offer is not accepted, it is deemed
75
withdrawn and may possibly affect the distribution of discovery costs.
The 1990 Act provides that if a claimant refuses an employer's offer
that was greater than the amount finally awarded by a compensation
order, the employer is not "liable for his fifty percent share of the
attorneys' fees to be paid to claimants' attorneys.' ' 7 6 On the other hand,
if the employer's offer is less than the amount awarded by the final

166. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-7 (Repl Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
167. See id. § 52-1-54(D) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Vigil, supra note 156, at 1.
171. This conclusion may be challenged by Rule 54 of New Mexico's Rules for Civil Procedure
which permits a court to require the non-prevailing party in a civil action to bear the opposing
party's costs. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054(e); see also Vigil, supra note 156, at 1.
172. N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-068; cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(F).

173. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 52-1-54(F).

174. Id.
175. Id. Subsection (F)(1) provides that if a party refuses to accept an offer of judgement by
the opposing party and the final judgement is "not more favorable than the offer," that party
must pay the opposing party's discovery costs incurred after the making of the offer. Id. § 52-154(F)(1). Although the 1990 Act does not define what makes a final judgement "more favorable
than an offer," presumably, this means a higher disability rating and therefore a greater benefits
award.
176. Id. § 52-1-54(F)(3).
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compensation
order, he is liable for one hundred percent of the claimant's
77
fee.1
The provisions relating to an employer's rejected offer of judgment
are problematic because the language of the statute implies that when
an employer's offer is greater than the final compensation order, the
claimant's attorney only receives fifty percent of her fee. 178 In this situation, an employer is relieved of paying his one-half portion of claimant's
attorneys' fees while the claimant is not required to compensate by
increasing his fifty percent share of fees. 179 This may tend to frustrate
the goal of encouraging settlement in workers' compensation litigation
because only the employer bears the risk of paying one hundred percent
of the claimant's fees. 8 0 If the employer makes no offer, he is only
liable for one-half claimant's fees. 18 1 The claimant, however, is only liable
for fifty percent under any circumstance."' Employers who are unwilling
to bear this risk will be hesitant to make an offer of judgment.
H.

Workers' Control Over Medical Care: Sections 52-1-49 and 52-1-5
In New Mexico, a worker injured during the ordinary course of her
employment has never enjoyed the privilege of selecting her own treating
physician at the employer's expense. 83 Each of the 1990 Act's predecessors
vested the employer with control over the choice of the claimant's health
care provider.1' 4
Professor Larson contends that the choice of treating physicians is
"one of the stormiest issues in the history of workers' compensation."'' 8
The controversy results form a conflict between the worker's interest in
selecting her own physician and the state's interest in "achieving maximum
standards of rehabilitation by permitting the compensation system to
exercise continuous control over the nature and quality of medical
services.' 8 6 The 1990 Act begins to tip the balance toward the claimant
by providing the injured worker with a modicum of control over both
the choice of the health care provider and the procedure for requesting

independent medical examinations.
177. Id. § 52-1-54(F)(4). This subsection states that the claimant "shall be relieved from any
responsibility for paying any portion of his attorneys' fees." Id.
178. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 67.
179. Id.
180. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(F)(4).
181. See id. § 52-1-54(J).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 105 N.M. 660, 662, 735 P.2d 1166, 1168
(Ct. App. 1987) ("In New Mexico, an injured workman is precluded from seeking independent
medical treatment at the employer's expense when the employer has indicated a willingness to furnish
treatment and actively makes such services available."). See Dunn, supra note 4, at 38-40, for a
more detailed discussion of the history of New Mexico's medical care provision.
184. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-49(A) (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-49 (Cum. Supp. 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-49(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
185. A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 61.12(b) (1981).
186. Montoya v. Anaconda Mining Co., 97 N.M. 1, 5, 653 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting 2 A. LARSON, WORKMENS' COMPENSATION LAW, § 61.12(b) (1981)); see also Dunn, supra
note 4, at 40.
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1. Selection of Health Care Provider: Section 52-1-49
The 1990 Act provides that "[t]he employer shall initially either select
the health care provider for the injured worker or permit the injured
worker to make the selection.' ' 8 7 The initial selection remains in effect
for the first sixty days of medical treatment, after which time the party
who did not make the initial selection "may select the health care provider
of his choice."' 88
The party who made the initial selection may object if the opposing
party selects a different health care provider after the initial sixty day
treatment period.'" The party must file a written objection within three
days of receiving notice that the opposing party is requesting a change
of treating physicians.' 90 The party seeking the change has the burden
of proving that the care being received is not reasonable. 91 The workers'
compensation judge is required to rule on the objection within seven
days. 192 The judge, in granting a change of physicians, may designate
either the requesting party's choice or the judge may chose a different
physician. 193
The 1990 Act permits either party, in the event of a disagreement over
the choice of the health care provider, to request a change of physicians
at any time. 94 The workers' compensation judge is required to rule on
the request according to the same standards and procedures which attend
a ruling on a party's objection to the initial choice of the treating
physician. 9 Thus, the judge must rule on the request within seven days;
the applicant bears the burden of proving that present care in unreasonable; and the judge may appoint the physician designated
in the
I
applicant's request or she may choose a different physician. 9
2. Independent Medical Examination: Section 52-1-51
Injured workers now have the right, previously enjoyed only by employers, to request an independent medical examination ("IME"). 97 If

187. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 52-1-49(B).

188. Id. § 52-149(C). The party seeking to change health care providers must file notice of the
name and address of its choice of health care provider with the other party at least ten days before
treatment with the new physician begins. Id. Notice of a change of health care providers may be
filed on or after the fiftieth day of the initial sixty-day period. Id.
189. Id. § 52-149(D).
190. Id. If the employer fails to file notice of his objection within the three day period, he is
liable for the cost of treatment provided by the claimant's health care provider until the employer
does file a notice of his objection and a workers' compensation judge rules on the objection. Id.
If the claimant falls to file notice of his objection within three days from receiving notice that the
employer seeks to change health care providers, then the employer is liable only for services provided
by the physician which he initially chose. Id.
191. Id. § 52-149(F).

192. Id.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
1991).

Id.
Id. § 52-1-51(E).
Id.
Id. § 52-149(F).
Id. § 52-1-51; cf. N.M.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 52-1-51 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1,
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a medical issue is disputed, either party may petition the judge for
permission to have the worker undergo an IME.1 " The judge then designates a physician from an approved list of health care providers to
perform the IME.199 The judge is not obligated to choose the petitioner's
original health care physician," and the employer pays the costs of any
IME.20 1
If the employer chooses the initial treating physician and then, after
sixty days, the injured worker selects a new health care provider, the
employer is entitled to periodic examinations of the worker conducted
by the physician she initially selected.2w Generally, the employer may not
request this type of IME more than once every six months. 2 3 The employer
must also compensate the worker for any reasonable expenses incidental
to submitting to an IME at the employer's request.20 ' Finally, the 1990
Act again demonstrates an intent to diminish the role of attorneys in
the compensation process by explicitly forbidding them from being present
at any IME.205
I. Notice: Section 52-1-29
The Act's notice provisions have been materially changed by the 1990
Act. The previous notice provision, which had not been amended since
its enactment in 1959, required an injured worker to "give notice in
writing to his employer of the accident and the injury within thirty days
after their occurrence.' '206 The 1990 Act, however, provides that a worker
seeking compensation give "notice in writing to his employer of the
accident within fifteen days." ' Not only does a worker now have only
fifteen days to give written notice, but also, the worker is required to
report all accidents, and not merely those which cause an injury.M
The 1990 Act retains the provision that an employee is not required
to give written notice of an occurrence of an accident when "the employee
or any superintendent or foreman ... had actual knowledge of the
occurrence.'' 2 9 The modifications to the Act's notice provisions, however,

198.
199.
by the
200.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-51 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
Id. § 52-1-51(A). The authorized list of physicians is generated by the "committee appointed
advisory council on workers' compensation." Id. § 52-1-51(B).
Id.

201. Id. § 52-1-51(B).
202. Id. § 52-1-51(D).
203. Id. The 1990 Act permits a workers' compensation judge to order independent medical
examinations within six-month intervals, "upon application . .. and reasonable cause therefore."
Id. The judge must exercise care to avoid harassing the claimant when considering an applicant
for additional IME's. Id.
204. Id. § 52-1-51(E). These expenses include "the cost of travel, meals, lodging, loss of pay or
other like direct expenses." Id.

205. Id. § 52-1-51(F).
206. Id. § 52-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) (emphasis added).
207. Id. § 52-1-29(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (emphasis added).
208. The worker is best advised, therefore, to report every work related accident regardless of
how insignificant it may be because an injury may not be detected until well after the occurrence
of the accident. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 51.
209. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-29(A).
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may still undermine precedent which determined
when the time require20
ments of the notice provision begins to run. 1
The amendments to the Act's notice requirements, while reducing the
time within which an employee must notify her employer of an accident,
protect workers by requiring that employers "post, and keep posted in
a conspicuous place" a notice which informs employees of the fifteen
day notice requirement. 2t ' A failure by an employer to conspicuously
post notices will toll the time in which a worker
must give notice of an
212
accident up to, but not exceeding, sixty days.
J.

Statutory Causes of Action and a Codified Defense
The legislature created two new causes of action and codified a common
law defense when it enacted the Workers' Compensation Act of 1990.
1. Bad Faith and Unfair Claims Processing: Section 52-1-28.1
The 1990 Act establishes a cause of action for bad faith practices while
simultaneously disposing of a similar, judicially created tort. In 1988,
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an injured worker could bring
a cause of action outside of the Workers' Compensation Act against an
213
employer's insurer for bad faith refusal to pay compensation benefits.
The 1990 Act, however, explicitly overrules this precedent by amending
its exclusivity provision to provide that "[n]o cause of action outside the
Workers' Compensation Act shall be brought by an employee ... against
the employer or his representative, including the insurer....
The 1990 Act provides elsewhere that employees may bring claims under
the Act for "unfair claim-processing practices or bad faith by an employer,
insurer or claim-processing representative.... ,,213 This provision instructs
the director of the Workers' Compensation Administration to adopt
definitions of unfair claims-processing and bad faith practices. 2 6 The
director may also investigate allegations
of bad faith or unfair claim
2 17
processing on his own initiative.
The 1990 Act imposes two types of penalties on employers and insurers
for bad faith or unfair claims practices.2 8 If a worker can establish that
an unfair or bad faith practice has occurred, the director or workers'
compensation judge may award the worker a benefit penalty of up to

210. See, e.g., Martinez v. Darby Constr. Co., 109 N.M. 146, 782 P.2d 904 (1989) (notice
requirement is tolled until worker has actual knowledge that injury is compensable); Montell v.
Orndorff, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680 (1960) (notice requirement tolled until reasonably diligent
worker knows or should know that he has suffered a work-related injury); see also Dunn, supra
note 4, at 51-52.
211. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-29(B).
212. Id.
213. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 9, 752 P.2d 693 (1988).

214. N.M.

STAT. ANN.

215. Id.§ 52-1-28.1(A).

216. Id.§ 52-1-28.1(E).
217. Id. § 52-1-28.1(A).
218. Id.§ 52-1-28.1(B).

§ 52-1-6.
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twenty-five percent of the initial benefit award. 2 9 The relevant section
provides that, if a worker can prove bad faith practices or unfair claimsprocessing, the worker "[s]hall be awarded, in addition to any benefits
due and owing, a benefit penalty not to exceed twenty-five percent of
Apparently, this provision's
the benefit amount ordered to be paid."' '
operation is non-discretionary; if a claimant demonstrates bad faith or
unfair practices, she is automatically awarded a benefit penalty.
The 1990 Act, in addition to a benefit penalty, fines employers, insurers
and claim-processing representatives who have demonstrated a history or
pattern of bad faith or unfair claims practices. 221 The director or a
workers' compensation judge may impose a civil penalty of up to one
thousand dollars for each violation of the new bad faith, unfair claimsprocessing provision.m Any civil penalty collected under this section shall
be deposited in the Workers' Compensation Administration fund. 223
2. Retaliatory Discharge: Section 52-1-28.2
Prior to the enactment of the 1990 Act, a New Mexican worker had
no remedy under the Act if her employer discharged or threatened to
discharge her for filing a workers' compensation claim. 224 The 1990 Act,
however, explicitly forbids an employer to discharge or threaten to discharge an employee solely because the employee seeks benefits under the
Act 225
The provision, establishing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge,
imposes civil penalties of up to five thousand dollars on employers who
violate the statute.n This section also requires the employer to offer to
rehire a worker227 who was discharged solely because she filed a claim
under the Act.
3. Falsified Employment Application Defense: Section 52-1-28.3
The Workers' Compensation Act of 1990 codifies a common law
affirmative defense to a compensation claim, but limits employers' recourse to the defense.2 New Mexico courts have recognized the "false
employment application" defense as a complete bar to recovery under

219. Id.

220. Id.
221. Id. § 52-1-28.1(C).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Williams v. Amax Chem. Corp., 104 N.M. 293, 720 P.2d 1234 (1986) (Act provides
no cause of action in tort or contract against employer where employer threatened employee with
termination because employee sought compensation benefits); Shores v. Charter Servs., Inc., 106
N.M. 569, 746 P.2d 1101 (1987) (Act does not allow a contract claim for wrongful discharge based
upon filing of a workers' compensation claim).
225. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28.2(A).
226. Id. § 52-1-28.2(C).
227. Id. § 52-1-28.2.
228. Id. § 52-1-28.3.
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the Act. 229 Section 52-1-28.3 of the 1990 Act, unlike its common law
counterpart, allows an employer to utilize this defense only when she
"clearly and conspicuously discloses that the worker shall be entitled to
no future compensation benefits if he knowingly or willfully conceals or
makes a false representation about the information requested" on a
written questionnaire. 230 Additionally, the statutory defense, unlike the
common law, distinguishes between "concealed information" and "false
showing for each in
representations, ' 231 and requires a slightly different
232
order for an employer to raise this defense.
Section 52-1-28.3 permits the false employment application defense only
when the medical condition that was concealed or falsely misrepresented
"substantially contributed to the injury or the disability.' '233 This contrasts
with the judicially-created defense that required only a "causal connection" between the misrepresented medical condition and the worker's
subsequent injury. 2 4 The heightened statutory requirement abrogates case
law which holds that the causal connection was satisfied by proof that
condition increased the risk that she
a worker's prior or pre-existing
235
job.
the
on
injured
be
would
K. Rehiring the Injured Worker and the Abolition of Vocational
Rehabilitation: Section 52-1-50.1
Since 1969, the legislature has required employers to provide vocational
rehabilitation services to workers injured in job-related accidents.2 6 The
purpose of this requirement was to restore the disabled worker to suitable
employment. 237 The statutorily mandated provision of vocational rehabilitation services was thought to serve the general public by allowing a
claimant to retrain herself for gainful employment and prevent her dependence on state welfare programs. 238 Despite its longstanding commit229. See Martinez v. Driver Mechenbier, Inc., 90 N.M. 282, 562 P.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1977). The
common law elements of the "false employment application" defense are: (1) the employee knowingly
and willfully misrepresented his physical condition; (2) the employer relied upon the misrepresentation;
(3) the employer's reliance on the misrepresentation was a substantial factor in hiring the employee;
and (4) there is a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the worker's subsequent
injury. See, e.g., Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight, 108 N.M. 124, 132, 767 P.2d 363, 371 (Ct.
App. 1988).
230. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28.3(B).
231. Id. § 52-1-28.3(A).
232. In the case of "concealed information," an employee must not be "aware of the concealed
information that, if known, would have been a substantial factor in the initial or continued
employment of the worker." Id. § 52-1-28.3(A)(2)(a). In order for the employer to utilize the "false
representations" defense, she must have relied "upon the false representation, and this reliance was
a substantial factor in the initial or continued employment of the worker." Id. § 52-1-28.3(A)(2)(b).
233. Id. § 52-1-28.3(A)(3).
234. See, e.g., Tallman, 108 N.M. at 132, 767 P.2d at 371.
235. See, e.g., Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1988).
For a more complete discussion of the 1990 Act's modifications of the false employment application
defense see Dunn, supra note 4, at 56-59.
236. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-50(A) (1978).
237. Id.
238. See Lane v. Levi Strauss & Co., 92 N.M. 504, 506-07, 590 P.2d 652, 654-55 (Ct. App.
1979); see also Jaramillo v. Consolidated Freightways, 109 N.M. 712, 716, 790 P.2d 509, 513 (Ct.
App. 1990).
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ment to vocational rehabilitation, the legislature, under the 1990 Act,
abolished employers' obligation to provide vocational rehabilitation services to injured workersY39
Instead of vocational rehabilitation, the revised Act imposes a duty
on employers under certain circumstances to rehire a worker who has
stopped work due to a compensable, work-related injury. 2m If an injured
worker applies for her pre-injury job or modified job similar to her preinjury work, her employer is obligated to rehire the injured worker if
two conditions are satisfied: (1) the worker's treating health care provider
certifies that the worker is fit to work; and (2) the "employer has the
pre-injury, or modified work available. '241 If a rehired worker received
compensation benefits prior to the date of maximum medical improvement, those benefits shall be reduced according to the formula utilized
to reduce temporary total disability benefits. 242
L.

Lump Sum Settlement: Section 52-5-12
New Mexico's Workers' Compensation law has traditionally not favored
lump sum settlements. The Old Act provided that "[ciompensation shall
be paid by the employer to the workman in installments." 24 The Act
permitted payment of compensation benefits in a lump sum only after
a judge determined that a lump sum payment was in the best interests
of the injured worker. 2" Section 52-5-12(A) of the 1987 Act, substantially
similar to the 1986 Act's lump sum provision,2 5 permitted an employee
to receive a lump sum benefit payment upon agreement of all parties
and only in special circumstances, "as when it can be demonstrated that
46
lump sum payments are clearly in the best interests of the parties.' '2
The 1990 Act retains its predecessor's declaration that the Act's "stated
policy" is that it is in the best interests of the injured worker to receive
benefits on a periodic basis.247 The revised Act, however, goes one step
further and prohibits lump sum payments of compensation and medical
benefits except in two narrowly drafted exceptions.2" The two exceptions
set out in section 52-5-12 of the 1990 Act define the exceptional circumstances that lawmakers believed justify lump sum settlements.24 9
239. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-50.
240. Id. § 52-1-50.1.
241. Id. § 52-1-50.1(A). The statute defines "rehire" as including "putting the injured worker
back to active work, regardless of whether he was carried on the employer's payroll during the
period of his ability to work,"

Id. § 52-1-50.1(C).

242. Id. § 52-1-50.1(B).
243. Id. § 30-1-30(A) (1978).
244. Id. § 52-1-30(B).
245. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-12 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
246. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-12(A) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
247. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-12(A) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
248. Id. § 52-5-12(B).
249. Despite the provision in the 1990 Act that lump sum payments are not permitted "[eixcept
as provided in subsections B, C and D," the 1990 Act allows two, not three, exceptions to its
general prohibition against lump sum awards. Id. § 52-5-12(A). Subsection D does not contain a
lump sum exception; rather, it sets out the penalty imposed on employers who enter into lumpsum payment agreements without the approval of a workers' compensation judge. Id. § 52-5-12
(D).
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Section 52-5-12(B) allows a worker, with the approval of a workers'
compensation judge, to elect to receive a lump sum payment award if
he has returned to work for at least six months and is earning at least
eighty percent of his pre-injury wage. 250 If a worker elects a lump sum
award under this provision, his award is limited to income attributable
to his initial impairment rating; 251 he is not entitled to an award based
on an enhanced impairment
rating modified by his age, education, and
22
loss of physical capacity. 1
The 1990 Act also permits an injured worker to elect to receive lump
sum payments, after the date of maximum medical improvement and
with the approval of a workers' compensation judge, for the sole purpose
of relieving debts which have accumulated during the worker's period
of disability. 253 Cognizant of the potentially burdensome administrative
25 4
costs of issuing weekly benefit checks for small amounts of money,
the revised Act also encourages the consolidation of weekly
payments of
25
less than twenty-five dollars into quarterly installments. 5
The restrictions on lump sum awards contained in the 1990 Act are
consistent with the common law's narrow construction of what circum26
stances warrant a lump sum award.
III.

RECENT WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASE LAW

No appellate court has yet been asked to interpret any provision of
the Workers' Compensation Act of 1990. Cases decided under prior Acts,
however, resolved several important issues that remain relevant under the
1990 Act. These issues include: appellate standard of review of workers'
compensation adjudications, the premises exception to the coming and
going rule, the definition of "three of more employees," pre-existing
injuries, out-of-state accidents, contracts for hire, and attorneys' fees.
A.

Appellate Standard of Review

The appellate standard of review for administrative agency determinations changed in New Mexico in 1984. The supreme court modified

250. Id. § 52-5-12(B).
251. Id.

252. Id.
253. Id. § 52-5-12(C).
254. See Dunn, supra note 4, at 50.
255. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-12(E).
256. Courts have insisted that only exceptional circumstances justify lump sum awards. See, e.g.,
Zamora v. CDK Contracting Co., 106 N.M. 309, 742 P.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1987) (lump sum awards
are appropriated only when a certain factual situation has emerged which, by its quantum and
quality of evidence, has convincingly demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances). Lump
sum awards are also appropriate when a lump sum payment would be in the best interests of the
worker, the parties and the general public. See, e.g., Arther v. Western Co. of N. Am., 88 N.M.
157, 538 P.2d 799 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975) (in applying the
Act's lump sum provision, the purpose of workers' compensation must be kept in mind: that
compensation be made in such a way as to secure the injured worker against need and to avoid
his becoming a public charge).
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the substantial evidence standard257 to include a review of the whole
record for findings of fact. 28 The appellate courts have struggled to
understand the new standard of review and to apply it consistently to
the myriad fact patterns that arise in agency cases. 2 9 This difficulty
continued when the courts attempted to apply the standard to workers'
compensation cases. 260 Despite confusion concerning the nuances of the
standard, the cases suggest an evolving harmony in results. The supreme
court clarified the application of the new standard to workers' compensation cases in Evans v. Valley Diesel.26' Thus, appellate review of workers'
compensation cases has shown improvement in congruent applications of
the new standard during the survey period.
The court of appeals first applied the whole record standard of review
to an action arising under workers' compensation legislation in Tallman
v. Arkansas Best Freight.6 2 The court set out the test as whether, on
the whole record, "there is evidence for a reasonable mind to accept as
adequate to support the conclusion reached.''2613 In applying the test, the
court required that the reviewer consider all evidence and discard any
discredited evidence. 26 It further required the court to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the 26agency
decision, but not with total
5
disregard to contravening evidence.

257. State appellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard of review to district court
decisions. Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 475-76, 697 P.2d 156, 158-59 (Ct.
App. 1985). It requires the appellate court to view only the evidence in the record supporting the
district court judgment. Id. The appellate court will uphold the judgment if the limited review of
the record shows substantial evidence to support the judgment. Id.
258. Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Bd., 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984).
259. See Browde, Substantial Evidence Reconsidered: The Post-Duke City Difficulties and Some
Suggestions For Their Resolution, 18 N.M.L. REv. 525 (1988).
260. See infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text.
261. 111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991).
262. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).
The court reasoned that Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Environmental Board, 101 N.M.
291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984), modified the substantial evidence standard for administrative agency
findings of fact. Id. at 127, 767 P.2d at 366. The new standard allowed the appellate court to
review the whole record, not merely evidence supporting the agency finding. Tallman, 108 N.M.
at 128, 767 P.2d at 367. The court reasoned that the Workers' Compensation Division is an
administrative agency, and that the court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent. Id. at
127, 767 P.2d at 366. The court found agency determinations must be closely scrutinized because
agencies function in dual roles, often acting as the complainant, prosecutor and fact finder in one
cause of action. Id. at 128, 767 P.2d at 367. Thus, the court of appeals held that the whole record
standard of review applies to workers' compensation cases. Id. at 126, 767 P.2d at 365.
The court's main objective, however, was to set forth guidelines on how to apply the new standard.
The court emphatically stated that the whole record standard of review does not invite nor allow
the appellate court to weigh the credibility of live witness testimony. Id. at 127, 767 P.2d at 366.
Not only would that be impossible, the court reasoned, but neither standard would allow reweighing
evidence or a reassignment of the preponderance of the evidence. Id. The new standard allows the
reviewing court, however, to search the entire record to determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support the result. Id. at 129, 767 P.2d at 368. In addition, the standard requires the
presence of some admissible evidence to sustain the holding. Id.
263. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 128, 767 P.2d at 367.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 129-30, 767 P.2d at 368-69.
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The court emphasized that the whole record standard of review is not
de novo review. 26 The agency decision enjoys a strong presumption, and
the ability of the court to make independent findings of fact is limited
to situations where the agency's findings are contrary to the stipulated
record . 267 Noting the agency's essential role as fact finding, the court
underscored the need for deference to agency knowledge and expertise. "
Finally, the court explained that no remand for fact finding is necessary
where the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof of eligibility for
benefits. 269 The court indicated that it would not hesitate to overrule an
agency grant of benefits if the whole record does not show substantial
evidence to support the determination. 270 In such a case, the court would
merely
remand for entry of judgment, regardless of the disposition be27 1
low.

The court of appeals muddied the waters in workers' compensation
cases, however, when it claimed to apply a different standard in Sosa
v. Empire Roofing Co. 272 The Sosa court focused on the claimant's failure
to meet his burden of proof when it affirmed the workers' compensation
judge's ("WCJ") denial of additional attorneys' fees. 273 While the court
easily could have based its holding on the standard set forth in Tailman,
it instead defined a different standard of review for cases involving failed
burdens of proof.2 74 This unnecessary departure from Tallman unfortunately increases confusion in an area of law that was just becoming clear.
The underlying case in Sosa involved a worker who was injured loading
asphalt blocks his first and only day on the job. 275 He was dismissed
later in the day when the employer discovered that he could not operate
a manual transmission.27 6 Sosa filed for workers' compensation, claiming
temporary total benefits and seeking permanent total disability.277 Empire
Roofing defended, claiming that Sosa was not an employee because he
never filled out necessary employment papers and that no one saw Sosa
injure himself. 278 The WCJ found Sosa's on-the-job accidental injury left
him five percent permanently partially disabled. 279 The parties settled for
a $5,500 lump sum benefit.2w
Sosa then filed a motion for attorneys' fees which exceeded the statutory
maximum of $12,500.28 His attorneys claimed that they spent 210 hours
266. Id.
267. Id.at 130, 767 P.2d at 369.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1990).
273. Id.at 616, 798 P.2d at 217.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 615, 798 P.2d at 216.
276. Id. The opinion is unclear whether the inability was skill-related or injury-related.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.; see N.M. STAT ANN. § 52-1-54(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1991).
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on the case because Empire Roofing contested all the facts and legal
theories of the case.2 2 In addition, they claimed Sosa's inability to speak
or read English greatly increased the required hours.38 Using the Fryar
v. Johnsen factors for assessing excessive fees,2 the WCJ found Empire
Roofing did not act in bad faith and that only fifty to eighty hours
were reasonably necessary. 2 5 The WCJ awarded $4,000 in fees, and Sosa
appealed.2 6 The court of appeals affirmed the award, holding that the
WCJ did not abuse his discretion
when he relied on his own expertise
7
in reaching his conclusions.2
The issue on appeal in Sosa was whether the WCJ's findings of fact
concerning the attorneys' fees were supported by substantial evidence. 2 88
In assessing this issue, the court declined to apply the Tallman whole
record-substantial evidence standard of review.2 It used a "somewhat
different''290 analysis, although it did not explain the need for change. 29'
The court defined a narrow standard, applicable only to cases where the
2
agency determines that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof. 9
Under the new standard, the court will affirm the determination if the
WCJ had a rational basis to disbelieve the claimant's evidence. 39 Thus,
the standard seems to apply only to cases where the WCJ denied benefits
to a claimant he disbelieved.
After defining this new standard, the Sosa court examined the evidence
advanced by the parties. It found that the WCJ deliberated carefully
before rejecting Sosa's claim and that Empire Roofing had presented a
meritorious defense inconsistent with bad faith.294 The court also rejected
Sosa's claim that Empire Roofing exhibited bad faith by asking the court
to consider a previous supreme court formal reprimand to Sosa's attorney
in its assessment of attorneys' fees under Fryar v. Johnsen.2 9 Finally,
the court refused to find abuse of discretion when the WCJ failed to
296
consider the attorney's waiver of Sosa's portion of the awarded fees.

282. Sosa, 110 N.M. at 615-16, 798 P.2d at 216-17.
283. Id.
284. 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979). The Fryar court added several factors to the statutory
analysis of excess attorney's fees, including access to adequate representation, attorney effort,
characteristics of the controversy and the experience of the attorney. Id. at 488, 601 P.2d at 721.
285. Sosa, 110 N.M. at 616, 798 P.2d at 217.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 617, 798 P.2d at 218.
288. Id. at 616, 798 P.2d at 217.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. The court cites two cases for using a different rule than Tallman, but does not explain how
these cases control. Id. (citing Luchetti v. Bandler, 108 N.M. 682, 684-85, 777 P.2d 1326, 132829 (Ct. App. 1989) (trial court not required to accept defendant's proof in its entirety and may
doubt a witness's conclusions); Nunez v. Smith's Management Corp., 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99
(Ct. App. 1988) (uncontradicted medical evidence rule requires the fact finder to accept only the
opinion of the expert, not the facts upon which the conclusion is based)).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 617, 798 P.2d at 218.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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The court stated that awarded fees belong to the claimant, not the
attorney. 291
In carefully examining the record and finding that Sosa failed his
burden of proof, the court reached the same result as would be obtained
under the Tallman standard. Under Tallman, the court would examine
the whole record in the light most favorable to the WCJ determination.
In Sosa, the court examined the whole record in a manner favorable to
the WCJ's denial of the bad faith claim. The new standard announced
in Sosa, therefore, is an unnecessary variation on Tallman.
In Evans v. Valley DieseP98 the court clarified the standard of review
and the appellate court role in agency adjudication. Valley Diesel employed
Evans as an automotive mechanic and allowed Evans to keep his personal
"mudbogger," a type of recreational vehicle, at the work site. 299 Valley
Diesel paid Evans by the hour when work was available, and allowed
3
0 Evans was not
Evans to work on the mudbogger during slow times.
30
mudbogger
the
on
working
paid for time spent
Evans was responsible for locking up the premises on September 18,
1987.32 As he started the mudbogger in order to move it inside the
30 3 Evans sustained injuries to his eyes.30
building, the battery exploded.
He successfully applied for benefits, and Valley Diesel appealed. 30 5 The
court of appeals reversed the workers' compensation judge's award. 306
for writ of certiorari and
The supreme court granted Evans' 3petition
7
0
award.
benefits
WCJ's
the
reinstated
The supreme court in Evans found that the court of appeals exceeded
its authority by replacing its view of the facts for the workers' compensation judge's view. 3 0 The court of appeals placed great significance
on the employer's disinterest in having the mudbogger moved inside
before the shop was locked. 3 9 It rejected the finding that Evans started
the mudbogger so that he could move his vehicle and thus secure the
refused to see this act as done
company property. 310 The court of3 Iappeals
1
in the course of his employment .
Appellate Judge Chavez dissented, adopting the workers' compensation
judge's view of the facts. The WCJ found that Evans regularly moved
the mudbogger before locking up, thus his employer had sufficient notice

297. Id.
298. 111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740 (1991).

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 557, 807 P.2d at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

307. Id.

308. Id. at 559, 807 P.2d at 743.
309. Id. at 557-58, 807 P.2d at 741-42.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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that "locking up" included moving the vehicle. 312 Because Evans consistently moved his vehicle in fulfilling his duties, Judge Chavez reasoned
that substantial evidence existed which supported the WCJ's
finding that
the accident occurred in the course of employment.' 13
The supreme court emphasized that while the entire record is reviewed
by the appellate court, it is done in the light most favorable to the
agency's decision. 314 Citing Tallman, the court limited the appellate court's
latitude to make independent findings of fact to exceptional circumstances,
such as an agency finding clearly contrary to the evidence in the record." 5
The supreme court found that the Evans record showed substantial
evidence to support the WCJ's finding. 316 Further, no special circumstances
317
existed to support the court of appeals' independent fact finding.
Therefore, the court of appeals' lack of deference to the WCJ's findings
in its reconsideration of the evidence constituted reversible error.318
After clearly setting out the parimeters of the proper standard of
review, the Evans court adopted Judge Chavez's two pronged test. 31 9
First, while agreeing that Evans' work on the mudbogger was personal,
the court found the WCJ's finding of linkage between moving the vehicle
and locking the premises a logical construction of the evidence.32° The
court also agreed that Evans was where he was "reasonably expected to
be and . . . engaged in a necessary incident of employment. 3 2' Second,
the court concurred with the WCJ's finding that the injury arose out
of Evans' employment because Valley Diesel received sufficient intangible
value from Evans' on-site work on the vehicle. 322
The Evans court found substantial evidence on review of the entire
record to support the WCJ's determination.3 23 In doing so, the supreme
court clarified that appellate courts must defer to the agency fact finding
under the whole record standard of review in workers' compensation
cases unless those findings conflict with the record.
B.

The Premises Exception to the Coming and Going Rule
The New Mexico Supreme Court first recognized the premises exception
to the coming and going rule for claims under the Workers' Compensation
312. Id. at 558, 807 P.2d at 742 (citing Valley Diesel and Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Evans, No. 11,558 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990) at 1-2, (Chavez, J., dissenting)).
313. Id. Judge Chavez further reasoned that the employer sufficiently benefitted from Evans'
work on the mudbogger so that the dual purpose of Evans' work, i.e., personal and professional,
justified the WCJ finding that the accident occurred in the course of employment. Id. (citing Smith
v. City of Albuquerque, 105 N.M. 125, 729 P.2d 1379 (Ct. App. 1986) (dual purpose)).
314. Id. at 558-59, 807 P.2d at 742-43 (citing National Council Compensation Insurance v. New
Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, 562 (1988); Tallman, 108 N.M.
at 129, 767 P.2d at 368).
315. Id. at 559, 807 P.2d at 743 (citing Tallman, 108 N.M. at 129-30, 767 P.2d at 368-69).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 506, 734 P.2d 743, 746 (1987)).
Id. (citing Kloer v. Municipality of Las Vegas, 106 N.M. 594, 596, 746 P.2d 1126, 1128

(Ct. App. 1987)).

323. Id. The court reinstated the WCJ's disposition.
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Act in Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 124This section will discuss
two New Mexico cases that have followed and further defined the premises
exception.a"
New Mexico's coming and going rule is codified at section 52-1-19.
Section 52-1-19 provides that "injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of employment ... shall not include injuries to any worker
occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or
after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which is not the employer's negligence. ' ' 326 This language provides compensation for emin
ployees injured "as a result of their employment and while at work
3 27
presence.
their
requires
business
employer's
their
any place where
Prior to Dupper, when granting compensation under section 52-1-19,
New Mexico courts held that if a worker was injured going to or from
work, the injury was compensable under the Act only if the employer's
negligence was the proximate cause of the worker's injury. 328 Absent
employer negligence, a "coming-and-going" accident was not considered
to be within the course of employment.3 29 In Dupper, the New Mexico
Supreme Court reassessed section 52-1-19 in order to bring New Mexico
in recognizing a premises exception to the
in line with every other 33state
0
rule.
going
and
coming
Dupper involved an employee who injured herself by tripping over a
"'
sprinkler head while on her way to the employee parking lot after work. 33
The worker's compensation judge adopted the premises exception to the
coming and going rule and awarded the worker benefits. 33 2 Following
of such an exception,
New Mexico precedent which denied the existence
333
the court of appeals reversed this decision.
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the award and formally adopted
the premises exception to the going and coming rule, overruling contrary
precedent. 3 4 Simply stated, the premises exception provides that an injury

324. 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987).
325. Constantineau v. First National Bank, 112 N.M. 38, 810 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cert. denied
112 N.M. 21, 810 P.2d 1241 (1991); Lovato v. Maxim's Beauty Salon, Inc., 109 N.M. 138, 782
P.2d 391 (Ct. App. 1989).
326. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). This provision has been part of each of
New Mexico's Workers' Compensation Acts, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19 (1978), and the
1990 Act has left this section undisturbed. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
327. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
328. Dupper, 105 N.M. at 504, 734 P.2d at 744 (citing Cuellar v. American Employer's Ins.
Co., 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 251 (1935)); see also 1 A..LARsoN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 15.44 (1990).
329. Dupper, 105 N.M. at 504, 734 P.2d at 744.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. (citing I A. LARSON, supra note 328, § 15.00 (1985)).
333. Id. (citing Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973)); Gonzales v. New
Mexico State Highway Dep't., 97 N.M. 98, 637 P.2d 48 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 621,
642 P.2d 607 (1981); Hayes v. Ampex Corp., 85 N.M. 444, 512 P.2d 1280 (Ct. App. 1973)).
334. Dupper, 105 N.M. at 504, 734 P.2d at 744. The court stated it was "time for New Mexico
to join every other state in the country in its view of compensability for injuries suffered on an
employer's premises." Id.
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occurring on the employer's premises is one occurring within the course
of employment even if it occurred when the worker was going to or
3 5
from work.
The Dupper court began its analysis by observing that when New
Mexico first enacted workers' compensation law, it limited employer's
liability under the coming and going rule to cases of negligence by the
employer. 3 6 In Cuellar v. American Employer's Insurance Co., 3 37 the
supreme court's first opportunity to interpret the Act's coming and going
rule, the court held that, absent negligence by the employer, a worker
injured going to or from work was not injured in the course of his
employment. 33 The Dupper court noted that subsequent decisions had
interpreted Cuellar as rejecting the premises exception to the coming and
3 39
going rule.
Cuellar notwithstanding, the court in Dupper argued that New Mexico
precedent supported adopting the premises exception. Fifty years before
Dupper, the court held that an accident arises in the scope and course
of employment when it occurs "at a place where the employee reasonably
may be in the performance of his duties . . . or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. ' ' 340 Moreover, New Mexico courts had carved
out a number of narrow exceptions to the coming and going rule. These
included the ."personal comfort" 34' and "special mission ' 342 exceptions.
The supreme court in Dupper remarked that these prior decisions rejected
a narrow reading of the coming and going rule in order to allow injured
343
workers to recover.
In recognizing the premises exception, the Dupper court held that a
worker "injured while on the employer's premises coming to or going
from the actual workplace, is in a place where" he is "reasonably expected
to be," and is "engaged in a necessary incident of employment." ' 344 The
court emphasized that the meaning of "course of employment" included
not only the time for which an employee is actually paid, but also a

335. Dupper, 105 N.M. at 506, 734 P.2d at 737. The court in Dupper adopted the Arizona
Supreme Court's formulation of the premises exception:
[W]hen an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the
employer's premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route
of employee's travel or is otherwise injured in a place he may reasonably be expected
to be.
Id. (quoting Pauley v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Ariz. 298, 302, 508 P.2d 1160, 1164 (1973)).
336. Id. (citing 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 83, § 12(L)).
337. 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685 (1932).
338. Id. at 145, 9 P.2d at 687.
339. Dupper, 105 N.M. at 504, 734 P.2d at 735.
340. McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N.M. 149, 153, 146 P.2d 867, 870 (1944).
341. See, e.g., Whitehurst v. Rainbo Baking Co., 70 N.M. 468, 734 P.2d 849 (1962) (worker
injured while crossing the highway during coffee break was entitled to compensation).
342. See, e.g., Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Servs. Dep't, 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65
(1976) (employee injured on special assignment was entitled to compensation).
343. Dupper, 105 N.M. at 506, 734 P.2d at 736.
344. Id. at 506, 734 P.2d at 746 (citing Federal Insurance Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 98
S.E.2d 214 (1957)).
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reasonable time period "during which employee is necessarily on the
while passing to or from the place where the work
employer's premises
3 45
is actually done.1
Furthermore, Dupper defined "premises" to include parking lots, whether
3
separate or on the premises, if intended for employee or customer use. 4
Finally, Dupper clarified that under its construction of section 52-1-19,
an employee need not prove employer negligence if the injury occurs
falls within the
while going to or returning from work and the injury
3 47
premises exception or any other recognized exception.
In Lovato v. Maxim's Beauty Salon, Inc.,34 the New Mexico Court
of Appeals extended Dupper to include injuries occurring on the "necessary route" to work. Lovato, an employee of Maxim's Beauty Salon
("Maxim's"), injured herself while on her way to work. 349 Maxim's leases
space on the lower level of Montgomery Ward's, located in a shopping
mall.3 50 Maxim's had told its employees to park in the lot on the eastern
351
side of Montgomery Ward's and to walk through the store entrance.
while inside Montgomery
Lovato slipped and fell on a heavily waxed floor
35 2
Ward's, before she -had reached the salon.
Lovato brought a claim for benefits which the workers' compensation
judge denied.113 The hearing officer found that Lovato's claim was barred
because she did not sustain an injury while on the employer's premises
this injury was within
as defined in Dupper.3 Lovato appealed claiming
35
an exception to the going and coming rule.
Maxim's argued that Lovato's claim was barred because she was between
two parts of the employer's premises.356 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that Lovato's claim was not barred because the trend in most states

345. Id.
346. Id. (citing 1 A. LARSON, supra note 328, § 15.42(a)).
347. Id. at 506-07, 734 P.2d at 736-37. Thus, Dupper overruled all cases that held otherwise.
Id. at 507, 734 P.2d at 737.
348. 109 N.M. 138, 782 P.2d 391 (Ct. App. 1989).
349. Id at 139, 782 P.2d at 392.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id at 139, 140, 782 P.2d at 392, 393.
354. Id. at 140, 782 P.2d at 393.
355. Id.
356. Id. A factual controversy existed as to whether Lovato walked straight from the designated
parking lot into the store. Maxim's claims that Lovato went from the designated parking area
through the mall entrance - not the entrance through the store. Id. at 139, 782 P.2d at 392. After
entering the mall, Lovato allegedly did not go straight to work but stopped off for coffee first.
Id. The court stated, however, that the discrepancy is irrelevant because the worker fell while in
the store on her way to the salon. Id. The injury occurred in a place she would have been had
she entered the store from the east parking lot as requested by Maxim's. The relevant issue involved
the location of the fail and whether it was an exception to the premises rule. Id.
Maxim's conceded that had the fall occurred in the parking lot, Lovato would be entitled to
benefits because of the premises exception stated in Dupper. Id. at 140, 782 P.2d at 393. Maxim's
argument focused on whether the area between the store and the parking lot constituted a "premises"
recognized by the premises exception to the coming and going rule. Id.
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was to recognize areas on the "necessary route" to work as "in the
course of employment.357
The court stated that parking lots are generally accepted as part of
an employer's premises. 38 Dupper stated that premises includes "parking
lots intended for employees or customers, whether 'within the main
company premises or separated from it'. ''359 Lovato was traveling between
two areas considered to be part of an employer's premises - the parking
lot and the salon.3 6 Because she was injured in an area she was reasonably
expected to travel while on her way to work, her claim falls within an
36
exception to the premises rule. 1
The Lovato court extended the Dupper definition of a "premise" to
include the area between the parking lot and the place of employment.36 2
Therefore, Lovato did not have to prove negligence in order to recover. 36 31
In Constantineau v. First National Bank,3 " the New Mexico Supreme
Court denied compensation in a situation similar to Lovato and Dupper.
Ms. Constantineau was on her way to work at First National Bank
located on the fourth floor of the First Plaza Building in downtown
Albuquerque. 3 6 She parked in her usual space in the Civic Center parking
facility and then walked to the First Plaza Building through an underground tunnel. 3 6 While walking out of the tunnel and into the Galeria,
Ms. Constantineau "tripped over a protruding portion of the wood floor"
and injured her shoulder.367
First National Bank had contracted with the parking facility for sixtythree of the one hundred spaces available for use by bank employees. 3
The Civic Center retained control over all other spaces by leasing them
to individuals. 369 First National Bank did not designate one of these
parking spaces to Ms. Constantineau; she independently choose her park3 70
ing option.

357. Id. at 140, 782 P.2d at 393; see I A. LARSoN, supra note 328, § 15.14.
358. Lovato, 109 N.M. at 140, 782 P.2d at 393. The location of the parking lot in relation to
the place of business is usually irrelevant. The parking lots need not be "owned, controlled, or
maintained by the employer." I A. LARSON, supra note 328, § 15.42(a). The parking lot need not
be exclusively used by the employer and may include parking lots for various shops in shopping
centers. Id.; cf. Constantineau v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 N.M. 38, 810 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App. 1991)
& text accompanying notes 64-80.
359. Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 506, 734 P.2d 743, 746 (1987). Other
jurisdictions have recognized that shopping mall parking lots are part of employer premises "whose
main premises are located within the mail." Lovato, 109 N.M. at 140, 782 P.2d at 393.
360. Lovato, 109 N.M. at 140, 782 P.2d at 393.
361. Id. at 141, 782 P.2d at 394.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. 112 N.M. 38, 810 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App. 1991).
365. Id.

366. Id.
367.
368.
369.
370.
of the

Id.
Id. at 39, 810 P.2d at 1259.
Id.
Id. The employee in this case therefore chose this lot and dealt with the building manager
Civic Center, not directly with her employer. Id.
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37
Ms. Constantineau sought benefits for injury resulting from her fall. '

The workers' compensation judge found that her injury did not372 arise
out of or during her course of employment and denied her claim. Ms.
Constantineau appealed, claiming she was on a necessary route between
37 3 She argued that under Dupper
two areas of the employer's premises.
and Lovato, she was entitled to compensation because the parking lot
was part of the employer's premises even if it was not intended for an
employee's use. 374 The supreme court upheld the workers' compensation
371
court's decision and denied compensation to Ms. Constantineau.
to extend
The issue before the court in Constantineau was whether
' 37 6 The court
Dupper to include "mere employee 'use' of a parking lot.
of appeals distinguished the facts of Dupper and Lovato and stated that
Dupper "requires some showing that the parking lot was intended for
the use of employees." ' 37 The court held that because "the parking lot
was not owned by employer, exclusively used by claimant, or assigned
nor require
by employer to claimant," First National Bank did not intend
37
exclusively.
structure
parking
its employees to use the
Employee use of a public parking structure was not enough to make
379
First National Bank
the lot part of the employer's premises. Therefore,
3
W*
injuries.
Constantineau's
was not liable for Ms.
2
In both Dupper s l and Lovato3 1 the claimant was injured while walking
between the work-place and a parking lot designated by the employer
for employee use. The worker in Constantineau, however, was hurt while

371. Id.
372. Id. at 38, 810 P.2d at 1258.
373. Id. at 39, 810 P.2d at 1259.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 39-40, 810 P.2d at 1259-60.
379. Id. at 39, 810 P.2d at 1259. The court noted that Constantineau argued below that the
Galeria was part of the employer's premises. Because she did not brief this on appeal, however,
the court deemed this issue waived. Id. at 40, 810 P.2d at 1260.
380. Judge Chavez dissented in this case because of the potential for unfair results. Id.at 40that
41, 810 P.2d at 1260-61. He argued that by limiting such claims to include only parking lots
are part of employer's premises and the actual place of employment, but not to include the area
used a
between the two, would lead to unfair results. Id. at 40, 810 P.2d at 1260. Judge Chavez
unassigned
an
in
parks
who
employee
An
results.
unjust
for
the'possibility
explain
to
hypothetical
injure
spot parks next to another employee who parks in an assigned spot. Id. If both employees
themselves on the way to work, this court would grant benefits to the employee with the assigned
parking spot, but not the one who did not warrant receiving a special parking place. Id. Judge
Chavez stated that the majority in this case went against the intent of the definition of premises
in Lovato
in Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987), and
112
v. Maxim's Beauty Salon, Inc., 109 N.M. 138, 782 P.2d 391 (Ct. App. 1989). Constantineau,
N.M. at 40, 810 P.2d at 1260. Lovato did not require that the parking lot be owned or controlled
by the employer. Id. In this case, the employer knew that employees regularly used the parking
structure. Id.Therefore, the parking structure should be considered part of the employers's premises.
Id. at 41, 810 P.2d at 1261.
381. 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987).
382. 109 N.M. at 141, 782 P.2d at 394.
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walking to work from a parking lot that the employer neither owned
nor designated. 3 '
The test that emerges from these cases for determining if the premises
exception applies is based on employer intent to control and foreseeability
of employee use.3 84 When a worker going to or from work is injured in
an area, such as a parking lot, that is either controlled by the employer
or designated by the employer for employee use, the court will consider
the injury to have occurred during the course of employment.3 a8 Similarly,
if, when travelling to or from work, an employee is injured while moving
between the workplace and an employee-controlled area, compensation
is appropriate. 8 6 In both situations, compensation is justified because the
employee is where he reasonably may be expected to be engaged in an
activity incidental to his employment.38 7
C. The Definition of "Three or More Employees": Section 52-1-2
The New Mexico Court of Appeals clarified section 52-1-2 of the 1987
Act which required compensation benefits only for employers who have
three or more employees in Garcia v. Watson Tile Works, Inc.388
Ramon Garcia was injured while employed by Watson Tile Works, a
small corporation which makes and sells tile. 38 9 Watson Tile Works is
run by Savern Watson and his wife who serve as directors and officers,
although neither receive compensation from the company. 39 At the time
of Mr. Garcia's accident, he was the only person working for the company
besides Mr. and Mrs. Watson.3 9' Prior to the accident, two other workers
had been employed for approximately one month; however, their employment ceased a few days before the injury. 392
Garcia brought a workers' compensation claim which was dismissed.3 93
The workers' compensation judge determined that Watson Tile Works
did not have the requisite number of employees necessary to be liable
under the Workers' Compensation Act.3 94 Therefore, the claim was dis-

383. Constanineau, 112 N.M at 39-40, 810 P.2d at 1259-60.
384. See, e.g., Garcia v. Mount Taylor Millwork, Inc., 111 N.M. 17, 801 P.2d 87 (Ct. App.
1990) (worker is protected by the Act when he was injured while crossing railroad tracks on his
way to work and employer had contracted with railroad to allow employees to cross tracks, and
crossing was the only way to get to and from workplace).
385. See Dupper, 105 N.M. at 503, 734 P.2d at 743.
386. See Lovato, 109 N.M. at 141, 782 P.2d at 394.
387. See Dupper, 105 N.M. at 506, 734 P.2d at 746.
388. 111 N.M. 209, 803 P.2d 1114 (Ct. App. 1990).
389. Id.at 210, 803 P.2d at 1115.
390. Id.Mrs. Watson works full-time for the state in addition to working with this company.
Id.
391. Id.at 211, 803 P.2d at 1116.
392. Id. at 211 n.1, 803 P.2d at 1116 n.l.
393. Id. at 209, 803 P.2d at 1114.
394. Id. But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(A) (effective Jan. 1,1991) (provision of 1990 Act
that places under the Act "all employers engaged in activities required to be licensed under the
provisions of the Construction Industries Licensing Act [Chapter 60, Article 13 NMSA 1978] regardless
of the number of employees" (emphasis added)).
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3 95 Sections 52-1-2 and
missed with prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.

compensation benefits
5-1-6(A) hold employers responsible for workers'
9
only if they employ three or more workers. 6 The court of appeals held

two workers at
that because the employer never employed more than
97
benefits.
to
entitled
not
was
Garcia
time,
one
any
Garcia argued that the Watsons were workers under section 52-1-7 and

3 98
that the company therefore employed at least three workers. The court

dismissed Garcia's argument. The court of appeals found support for
the workers' compensation judge's determination that the Watsons were
not considered employees under the Act, because they never received

compensation. 399 Under section 52-1-7, executive officers owning stock of
ten percent or more are considered employees." The court stated, however, that in using the term "employees," the statute meant to exclude

corporate owners-officers. 4' The court of appeals determined that the
workers' compensation judge appropriately found the Watsons did not

qualify as workers, and were not subject to the Act.402

The Garcia court also discussed the time frame used to determine the

the
number of employees. 4°3 Because the Act is silent on this matter,
404 Garcia
court determined that "fundamental fairness is the guideline."
argued in favor of using the exact date of the injury as the critical point.
The court rejected this argument because focusing on the exact date of
the injury to count employees would lead to unfair results if the number
of employees varies.405 Therefore, the court adopted a regular employment
4 6

test which would provide a more stable and predictable standard. 0 This
test provides that "if an employer has once regularly employed enough
workers to come under the Act, he remains there even 0when the number
employed may temporarily fall below the minimum."

Because the workers' compensation judge used the time of injury to

determine the number of employees instead of the regular employment

395. Garcia, 111 N.M. at 210, 803 P.2d at 115.
396. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-2, -6(A) (Repl. Parnp. 1987) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991).
397. Garcia, 111 N.M. at 211, 803 P.2d at 1116.
398. Id. at 210-11, 803 P.2d at 1115-16; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) (effective
until Jan. 1, 1991). Employees are automatically covered under the Act unless they elect exemption
and follow a certain procedure. Id. § 52-1-7. Garcia argued that because the Watsons did not
request exemption, they should be counted as employees. Garcia, 111 N.M. at 210, 803 P.2d at
1115. Under section 52-1-7(E), however, even employees who elect not to be subject to the Act
will be counted when determining the number of employees for other purposes. Even if the Watsons
were counted as employees, Watson's argument is not valid because Watson Tile Works never had
more than three employees working at any one time as required under sections 52-1-2 and 52-16(A). Garcia, Ill at 211, 803 P.2d at 1116.
399. Garcia, 111 N.M. at 210, 803 P.2d at 1115.
400. Id.
401. Id. (citing IC A. LARsoN, supra note 328, § 52.31).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 211, 803 P.2d at 1116.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
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test, the court stated that ordinarily it would remand the case.40 Watson
Tile never employed more than two employees at any one time, however,
and thus the court found remand unnecessary and affirmed the dismissal
of the claim.
D.

Pre-Existing Injuries
The court of appeals discussed the effect of pre-existing injuries on a
worker's claim for subsequent injuries in Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Chavez.410 Employee Chavez worked for Kennecott from 1970 until 1986. 4 "
In August 1977, he injured his knee while playing baseball.4 12 In September
1977, he became disabled at work.41 3 In 1978, he had surgery and took
nine months to recuperate, during which time, Chavez was not terminated.4 14 When he returned to work, he experienced no difficulties from
the injury. 4 " In July 1986, however, he reinjured his knee while jumping
onto a bulldozer ladder and tore a ligament. 4 6
Chavez received workers' compensation benefits from Kennecott.4 1 7
Kennecott then filed a claim seeking reimbursement from the New Mexico
Subsequent Injury Fund ("Fund"). 4 8 Kennecott did not file a certificate
of pre-existing impairment until after the injury in 1986.419 Applying the
New Mexico Subsequent Injury Act, the judge found the Fund responsible
for fifty percent of the benefits paid to the employee.420 The Fund appealed
the decision claiming Kennecott had insufficient knowledge of a preexisting
42
impairment. '
The Kennecott court stated that one purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is "to encourage employers to hire or retain workers they
know are handicapped."422 The court, however, held that mere knowledge
of injury and treatment is not sufficient evidence to show that the employer
was aware of any permanent impairment.423 Such an inference may be

408. Id.
409. Id.
410. 111 N.M. 366, 805 P.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1990).
411. Id. at 369, 805 P.2d at 636.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-2-1 to -13 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
419. Kennecot, 111 N.M. at 369, 805 P.2d at 636.
420. Id.
421. Id. The court's role in reviewing the evidence is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine
if substantial evidence exists from the whole record to support the lower court's decision. See
Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 1249 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App. 1988). The Fund
argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the employer knew of the employee's
previous impairment. No visible signs of impairment existed, such as a limp or other physical
problems. Kennecott, Ill N.M. at 370, 805 P.2d at 367. The Fund claims the only knowledge the
employer had was that worker: "(1) was injured in 1977; (2) had surgery on his knee; and
(3)
returned to work after a nine-month recuperation period." Id.
422. Kennecott, I ll N.M. at 370, 805 P.2d at 367.
423. Id.
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accurate where the injury is of a serious nature or of a particular type. 2
The court of appeals found this injury fit into the serious nature category.
Evidence from medical experts submitted at the workers' compensation
hearing showed that this was the type of injury from which recovery
was "notoriously hard." 421 Because it required such426an extensive recovery

period, the employer should have been on notice.

to return to work with no
The fact that the worker recovered 42enough
7 Kennecott knew of the previous
situation.
the
affect
not
did
difficulties
injury and was aware that the type of work required might create
was able to accomplish
difficulties. 4n Therefore, the fact that the worker
429 The New Mexico Supreme
recovery.
to
right
the
mitigate
not
did
his job

Court recognized that even a vague knowledge of an employee's injury

was sufficient to allow the filing of a certificate after a subsequent
knew
injury. 4 0 In this case the evidence exceeded this level. The employer
4
3
the injury required surgery and an extensive recovery period.

that the second
The Fund argued that no evidence existed to prove
4 2 They also argued
injury affected the same cartilage as the first injury.
that no proof existed to show that the damage to the cartilage was worse

because of the first injury. 433 Section 52-2-9 of the 1986 Act required
that the judge must determine that the disability was "materially and
than
substantially greater" as a result of the combination of impairments
44

The court
it would have been as a result of the later accident alone.
affect
must
explained that the Act does not require that the second injury
only
Act
The
the same part of the body or create the same impairment.
subsequent
the
requires "that the disability(not impairment) suffered after
injury be greater435 than it would have been if worker had not already

been impaired.

'

424. Id.
a
425. Id. A doctor testified that the type of surgery performed on the employee "results in
10% permanent impairment to the lower extremity, even without complications." Id. Furthermore,
results
removal of cartilage, according to the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons standards,
Id.
impairment.
permanent
percent
a
five
in
426. Id.
427. Id. at 371, 805 P.2d at 368.
heavy
428. Id.The worker's job included climbing on and jumping off of bulldozers and other
labor. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. (citing Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware, 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d 241 (1986)).
431. Kennecott, Ill N.M. at 372, 805 P.2d at 639.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-9 (Cum. Supp. 1986). This section states:
[wihen an employee of an employer subject to the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act ... who has a permanent physical impairment and who incurs
a subsequent disability by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,
which results in a permanent disability, that is materially and substantially greater
than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, then the
employer ... shall pay awards of compensation for the combined condition of
disability ....
This section remains virtually unchanged under the 1990 Act. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-9 (Repl.
Pamp. 1991).
435. Kennecott, 111 N.M. at 372, 805 P.2d at 639.
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The court of appeals in Kennecott further upheld the WCJ's decision
that the worker was totally disabled because he could not return to the
same or similar employment.436 Furthermore, the employer sufficiently
proved that employee was not capable of earning a comparable wage
under the 1986 Act's definition of total disability contained in section
52-1-24. 4 17 A judge has flexibility in determining comparable wage considerations and does not have to rely on speculative possibilities. 43
When apportioning liability between prior and subsequent injuries, the
court is not bound by expert testimony, but must determine whether
substantial evidence existed to support the lower court's finding. 439 The
court of appeals in Kennecott found that substantial evidence supported
the WCJ's findings. 40 The Fund was therefore responsible for reimbursing
the employer for fifty percent of the benefits paid to the worker."'
E.

Out-of-State Injuries and Contract of Hire
Orcutt v. S & L Paint Contractors, Ltd." 2 addressed the qualifications
of a "contract of hire" and issues involving an out-of-state injury. Mr.
and Ms. Orcutt were residents of Albuquerque . 4 3 S & L Paint Contractors
("S & L"), owned by a New Mexico resident, had offered Mr. Orcutt
a job in Las Vegas, Nevada over the telephone. 4" This job involved
repairing and painting heavy equipment for auction resale." 5 During this
phone conversation, employer (Clark) offered a job to Ms. Orcutt through

436. Id. The workers' compensation judge made the following findings that support this: "(1)
the same doctor who stated worker could go back to work placed restrictions on worker's ability
to crawl, climb, squat, and press on heavy clutches; (2) worker testified there was no light duty
available with employer; (3) worker's duties before his subsequent injury included climbing onto
large pieces of machinery, using clutches, and performing other strenuous activities; (4) employer's
doctor submitted a letter to employer after worker's second injury, stating that worker is a 'poor
candidate and a risk for additional injury' should he return to employment with employer." Id.
437. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (Cum. Supp. 1986). This section defines "permanent
total disability" as:
a permanent physical impairment to a workman resulting by reason of an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of employment whereby workman is wholly
unable to earn comparable wages or salary.
This section reflects a "loss of occupation," or "wage loss," theory of compensation. See supra
notes 60-65 and accompanying text. The 1990 Act adopts a pure physical impairment model of
permanent total disability. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-25; see supra notes 83-88 and accompanying
text.
438. Kennecott, 111 N.M. at 373, 805 P.2d at 640 (citing Kincaid v. WEK Drilling Co., 109
N.M. 480, 786 P.2d 1214 (Ct. App. 1990)). The WCJ in Kennecott found that evidence stating
employee could earn a comparable wage if he were to obtain a master's degree to be too speculative
to consider. Kennecott, 111 N.M. at 373, 805 P.2d at 640.
439. Id. (citing Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123 (Ct.
App. 1988)).
440. Orcutt, 109 N.M. at 373, 805 P.2d at 370.
441. Id.
442. 109 N.M. 796, 791 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1990).
443. Id. at 797, 791 P.2d at 72.
444. Id.
445. Id. The company's primary place of business is Iowa, although employees travel to many
states for different jobs. Id.
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Mr. Orcutt.4 Mr. Orcutt never mentioned this to his wife.4 Ms. Orcutt,
not knowing about the job offer, went to Las Vegas with her husband,
planning "to walk around" while her husband worked." Once the Orcutts
arrived in Las Vegas, Clark offered a job to Ms. Orcutt which she
accepted."9 However, after working only three hours,450Ms. Orcutt fell
off of a dump truck and injured her back and ankle.
Ms. Orcutt accumulated $4,623.60 in medical expenses and she applied
45
for workers' compensation in Nevada. ' Nevada concluded that Ms.
employee. 45 2
Orcutt was temporarily working in the state as an out-of-state
Since she had failed to obtain coverage in Las Vegas, Nevada denied
her benefits. 45 3 Ms. Orcutt then sought workers' compensation in New
Mexico.4 Her claim was denied and the court of appeals upheld this
denial. 5
Section 52-1-64 of the 1987 Act provides that if an employee working
outside of the state is injured and the employee would be entitled to
the employee can
benefits if the injury occurred within the state, then
4 5 Only one situation
met.
are
criteria
four
of
one
if
benefits
receive
applies to these facts; the employee must show she entered into a contract
of hire in New Mexico and that Nevada's compensation laws do not
apply. 456 The court of appeals determined that Ms. Orcutt did not enter
into such a contract in New Mexico, because457she did not travel to Las
Ms. Orcutt did not even
Vegas with the intent of working for S & L.
been extended to her
have
might
that
employment
of
offer
any
of
know
4 5
through her husband.
The court of appeals interpreted section 52-1-64 literally to include
coverage only for employment 'localized' here" or where "the 'contract

446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 799, 791 P.2d at 74. S & L did not pay any travel expenses for Ms. Orcutt and her
husband paid for half of the motel room. Id. The court took this as evidence that Ms. Orcutt
never intended to work for S & L. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 797, 791 P.2d at 72.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 801, 791 P.2d at 76.
455. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-64 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective until Jan. 1, 1991). These criteria

are:

A. his employment is principally localized in this state; B. he is working under a
contract of hire made in this state in employment not principally localized in any
state; C. he is working under a contract of hire made in this state in employment
principally localized in another state whose workmen's compensation law is not
applicable to his employer; or D. he is working under a contract of hire made in
this state for employment outside the United States and Canada.
1991)
The 1990 Act contains no major changes. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-64 (Repl. Pamp.
in
localized
principally
was
L
&
S
that
claimed
party
neither
Orcutt,
In
1991).
1,
(effective Jan.
New Mexico. Orcutt, 109 N.M. at 798, 791 P.2d at 73.
456. Orcutt, 109 N.M. at 798, 791 P.2d at 73.
457. Id. at 799, 791 P.2d at 74.
458. Id.
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of hire' was formed in the state. ' 459 In analyzing these facts, the court
of appeals used the "place-of-contract or place-of-hiring test" to determine
whether Ms. Orcutt should receive compensation.46 0 This involves a typical

contract analysis."' Because Ms. Orcutt did not receive an offer for

employment until she was in Nevada, the place of her acceptance, the
contract is not deemed effective in New Mexico." 2 Although an employee
may accept an offer through actions alone, her traveling to Nevada did
not constitute acceptance in this case."3 Ms. Orcutt was not even aware
of an offer.4" The court therefore concluded that this contract was formed

in Nevada.46

Ms. Orcutt further argued that under the United States Constitution,
New Mexico must give full faith and credit to final judgments of other
states." 6 The court of appeals dismissed this contention because this was
not a pertinent issue before the court. 467 Nevada did not determine that
this contract was made in New Mexico; it merely held that Ms. Orcutt
was "an out of state employee and temporarily within the state" under
Nevada law.46 The New Mexico courts adopted this determination; however, the court made its own determination that the contract was created
in Nevada." 9 To manipulate full faith and credit to create coverage for
Ms. Orcutt would force the court to step outside the statutory provisions
of workers' compensation in New Mexico. 470
Ms. Orcutt finally argued that her employer should be "estopped from
denying workers' compensation benefits" because he told the hospital
and Ms. Orcutt that he would pay for her medical expenses. 47' However,
this theory does not apply here. Ms. Orcutt did not rely on any representations about coverage before accepting this job. 472 Therefore, she was

459. Id. at 798, 791 P.2d at 73.
460. Id. (citing 4 A. LARSON, supra note 328, § 87.31).

461. Id. The court relied on the

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND)

§ 22 (1981) to explain

the requirements of offer and acceptance. Id.
462. Orcutt, 109 N.M. at 798, 791 P.2d at 74.
463. Id. at 799, 791 P.2d at 74.
464. Id. Mr. Orcutt never informed Ms. Orcutt about the offer to work for S & L. She apparently
went to Nevada only because her husband was planning to work in Las Vegas.
465. Id. The court was not swayed by Ms. Orcutt's humanitarian plea for compensation. Although
the court recognized the public policy concern to compensate injured workers, Ms. Orcutt's interpretation would lead to "strained, impractical or absurd results." Id. Instead of considering the
individual nature of this accident, the court followed the specific provisions of the Act, citing
fundamental fairness as its guide. Id. The court also determined it was "unable to help worker in
her predicament" of being stuck in a "crack" between the wordings of Nevada's and New Mexico's
workers' compensation laws. Id. at 800, 791 P.2d at 75.
466. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
467. Orcult, 109 N.M. at 799, 791 P.2d at 74.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 800, 791 P.2d at 75. The court found no New Mexico authority supporting an estoppel
argument. If such authority existed, the employee would have to show that she "knew or heard
of the coverage and that such knowledge induced her to accept the employment or to take any
action or position in reliance upon it which she would not have taken otherwise." Id. No evidence
existed to support such a claim in this case. Id.
472. Id.
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not induced into working based on any representations by her employer.-

F. Attorneys' Fees
Appellate courts addressed several aspects of attorneys' fee awards

under the Act during the survey period: fees for legal services provided
before the termination of a claimant's benefits; the economic loss requirement; and the bad faith requirement.

1. Attorneys' Fees for Legal Counseling Before Termination of
Benefits

The supreme court clarified the categories of legal services eligible for
compensation in workers' compensation cases in Sanchez v. Siemens Trans4
mission Systems.47 4 In interpreting section 52-1-54(D)(2) of the 1987 Act, "
the supreme court reinstated a workers' compensation judge's award of
attorneys' fees that included reimbursement for legal counseling performed
476
before the employer terminated the claimant's disability benefits.
Sanchez was awarded temporary total disability4 benefits after she injured
her back lifting automobile batteries at work. " In claimant's bid for
attorney's fees, Sanchez's attorney testified that he spent 118 hours on
terminated her benefits. 478
her claim, including 11.5 hours before 4Siemens
79 thereby awarding compensation
The WCJ awarded fees for 111 hours,
for at least 4.5 hours of pre-termination counseling.
The court of appeals reversed the WCJ's award when it calculated the
hours charged for services and found that they possibly included 4counseling
80°
before the termination of benefits. It reasoned that the statute ' required
a recovery of workers' compensation benefits before attorneys' fees became
compensable.482 The court therefore reasoned that the claimant received
no benefit from the attorney's services if she had not yet suffered a
4 3
The supreme court vigorously disagreed."
termination of her benefits.
the plain meaning of the statute and
examined
first
court
The supreme
scope of compensable legal
permissible
the
"define
not
did
it
that
found
4 5 The court saw the statute as a classifying scheme of
representation."
compensable cases, rather than a legislative mandate specifying the charge-

473. Id.
474. 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726 (1991).
475. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (Repl. Pamnp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
476. Siemens, 112 N.M. at 535, 817 P.2d at 728.
477. Id.at 534, 817 P.2d at 727.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991) ("[W]here
.then the comcompensation... is refused and the claimant shall thereafter collect compensation ..
pensation to be paid to the attorney shall be fixed by the hearing officer.").
482. Siemens, 112 N.M. at 534, 817 P.2d at 727.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 534-35, 817 P.2d at 727-28.
485. Id. at 534, 817 P.2d at 727.
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able time or billable amount to be reimbursed. 4" Therefore, the court
found nothing within the statute to preclude recovery for pre-termination
counseling.487
Turning to a public policy argument, the court sought to promote the
timely education of claimants and employers by encouraging early consultation with attorneys on statutory rights and liabilities.4 The court
wished to avoid any "chilling" effect its interpretation of the statute might
have on such education.4 9
Finally, the court noted that the WCJ's award of benefits was not an
abuse of discretion.4 9 Here there was a clear relationship between the
attorney's services and the recovery of benefits, as required by statute.4 9'
Furthermore, the court has an interest in assuring adequate representation
through fair compensation of attorneys' work.4 9 Thus, reasonable counseling performed by the attorney prior to termination of benefits is now
clearly compensable. 49a
2. Economic Loss Requirement for Award of Attorneys' Fees
In Pineda,494 the claimant cross-appealed the denial of her claim for
attorney's fees arising under section 52-1-54(C)(2) on the theory that a
delay in payment is an economic loss as a matter of law. 495 The court of
appeals disagreed, and affirmed the Workers' Compensation Division
("WCD") required showing of an actual economic loss. 49
The court allowed that a delay in payment could cause an economic
loss, but did not constitute one per se. 497 Because Pineda did not show
evidence of an economic loss at the WCD hearing, the court did not reach
the issue of the scope of a compensable loss.4 98 Instead, the court found
the issue was not preserved for appeal and stated that any other result
would allow recovery of attorneys' fees on a mere showing of bad faith
by the employer.4 99 Reasoning that the legislature could have required only

486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 534-35, 817 P.2d at 727-28. This policy also promotes dispute resolution between the
parties before the jurisdiction of the judicial system need be invoked.
489. Id. at 535, 817 P.2d at 728.
490. Id. (citing Woodson v. Phillip Petroleum Co., 102 N.M. 333, 339, 695 P.2d 483, 489 (1985)
(attorneys are entitled to adequate compensation for work necessarily performed in workers' compensation cases); Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 62, 582 P.2d 1270, 1275 (1978) (standard
of review for award of attorney's fees by WCJ is abuse of discretion)).
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 536, 817 P.2d at 729. In addition, the court reiterated that attorney's fees are not
controlled by the size of the award. Id. at 535, 817 P.2d at 728. It strongly rejected a percentage
of award calculation of attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases in order to promote vindication
of small, but legitimate claims, even if the fees exceed the amount of the award. Siemens, 112
N.M. at 535, 536, 817 P.2d at 728, 729 (quoting Woodson, 102 N.M. at 338, 695 P.2d at 488).
494. Id.
495. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(c)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
496. Pineda, Ill N.M. at 541-42, 807 P.2d at 239-40.
497. Id. at 541, 807 P.2d at 239.
498. Id. at 541-42, 807 P.2d at 239-40.
499. Id. at 542, 807 P.2d at 240.
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bad faith, the court refused to rewrite the statute by vitiating the economic
loss requirement.m0
3. Bad Faith Requirement for Award of Attorneys' Fees
In Cass v. Timberman Corp.,"' the supreme court reinstated the Workers'
Compensation Division's award of attorneys' fees under the 1986 Act based
In doing so, the
on a finding of bad faith actions by the employer.
court affirmed the right of the injured employee to seek second medical
3
opinions when serious and risky medical interventions are proposed.
Robert Cass, a carpenter, suffered a neck injury when he was hit by
scaffolding in May, 1987.04 Little progress resulted from his initial visits
to a general physician.A' After receiving permission from the claims adjuster, Cass sought treatment from a neurosurgeon who recommended a
0
myelogram and possible surgery. ' Frightened by this recommendation,
The
Cass sought permission from the adjuster for a second opinion.
his
of
Cass
inform
adjuster said he would consider the request and
decision."
notice
Cass did not hear from the insurance company until he received
9 The notice
1987.10
14,
of the termination of his benefits on December
cited Cass's failure to follow the recommendations of the general practitioner and the neurosurgeon.31' Cass subsequently sought treatment from
a third physician, who recommended aggressive physical therapy rather
than surgery." t ' The hearing officer in Cass found this treatment recommendation reasonable.512 He further found that the employer's termination
bad faith. 513
of benefits without good cause or a hearing amounted to
Section 52-1-54 of the 1986 Act required that the worker pay his own
attorneys' fees unless the employer acted in bad faith and the employer's
l4
bad faith caused the worker economic loss.5 A worker was entitled under
the 1986 Act to recover "reasonable attorneys' fees" from a bad faith
employer. " '

500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.

Id.
111
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

N.M. 184, 803 P.2d 669 (1990), rev'g 110 N.M. 158, 793 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1990).
at 187, 803 P.2d at 672.
id.
at 185, 803 P.2d at 670.

506. Id.
507. Id. at 185-86, 803 P.2d at 670-71.
508. Id. at 186, 803 P.2d at 671.
509. Id.

510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-54(C)(2) (1986).
515. Id. The "bad faith" and "economic loss" requirements of the 1986 Act are nearly identical
to the analogous provisions of the attorneys' fee statute under the 1990 Act. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-1-54(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). The 1990 Act, however, limits to $2,500
the amount that a WCJ can fine an employer who has acted in bad faith. Id.
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The employer's bad faith actions in Cass resulted in an economic loss
to Cass,51 6 and the hearing officer awarded him $10,000 in attorneys' fees,
a "reasonable amount.' '517 The court of appeals reversed this award, citing
a lack of substantial evidence to support it.s" The supreme court disagreed,
and reversed to reinstate the award. 1 9
The Cass court focused on the application of the whole record standard
of review. 2° It emphasized that the standard does not entertain a reweighing
of the evidence. 5 2' Rather, the standard mandates affirmance if "substantial
evidence exists upon which a reasonable mind would have made such a
decision .. "522
In examining the record, the supreme court in Cass noted that Timberman
based its termination of benefits on Cass's failure to follow the directions
of the general physician.5 23 The court further noted that the general physician
had no expertise in neurology and had not performed any tests to determine
whether a neurological problem existed.5 2ACass claimed that Timberman
terminated his benefits solely in response to his request for a second
opinion.5 2
The court observed that the record showed that Cass was not recalcitrant
towards either his physicians or his claims adjuster, but merely requested
a second opinion.5 26 The court differentiated between a refusal to cooperate
and a request for a second opinion and found the request reasonable.5 27
The court in Cass labeled the employer's conduct as "reckless disregard
of claimant's rights. . . . "28 Thus, the court found the record supported
the hearing officer's determination that Timberman acted in bad faith and
reversed the court of appeals.529 The supreme court also awarded Cass
one thousand dollars in attorneys' fees incurred during appellate proceed530
ings.
IV. CONCLUSION
This survey period saw a fundamental change in workers' compensation
law in New Mexico. The Workers' Compensation Act of 1990 has sub516. The "economic loss" element of the statute was not explored in the opinion's discussion
of the hearing officer's findings, nor in the supreme court's analysis. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 511-54(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
517. Cass, II1 N.M. at 186, 803 P.2d at 671.
518. Id. The court of appeals opinion, Cass v. Timberman Corp., 110 N.M. 158, 793 P.2d 288
(Ct. App. 1990), was withdrawn.
519. Cass, Ill N.M. at 187, 803 P.2d at 672.
520. Id. at 186-87, 803 P.2d at 671-72.
521. Id. at 187, 803 P.2d at 672.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. The nature and serious risk of the proposed procedure impressed the court. Id. (citing
Aranda v. D.A. & S. Oil Well Servicing, Inc., 98 N.M.'217, 647 P.2d 419 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982)).
528. Cass, I11 N.M. at 187, 803 P.2d at 672.
529. Id.
530. Id.
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stantially amended prior statutory law and upset many common law doctrines. Furthermore, courts during the survey period resolved several
important issues that remain relevant under the 1990 Act.
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